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SubjectRe: [PATCH net v3 2/2] net: rose: fix null-ptr-deref caused by rose_kill_by_neigh
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On Fri, 2022-06-24 at 09:05 +0800, Duoming Zhou wrote:
> When the link layer connection is broken, the rose->neighbour is
> set to null. But rose->neighbour could be used by rose_connection()
> and rose_release() later, because there is no synchronization among
> them. As a result, the null-ptr-deref bugs will happen.
>
> One of the null-ptr-deref bugs is shown below:
>
> (thread 1) | (thread 2)
> | rose_connect
> rose_kill_by_neigh | lock_sock(sk)
> spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock) | if (!rose->neighbour)
> rose->neighbour = NULL;//(1) |
> | rose->neighbour->use++;//(2)
>
> The rose->neighbour is set to null in position (1) and dereferenced
> in position (2).
>
> The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below:
>
> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
> ...
> RIP: 0010:rose_connect+0x6c2/0xf30
> RSP: 0018:ffff88800ab47d60 EFLAGS: 00000206
> RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 000000000000002a RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: ffff88800ab38000 RSI: ffff88800ab47e48 RDI: ffff88800ab38309
> RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1001567062
> R10: dfffe91001567063 R11: 1ffff11001567061 R12: 1ffff11000d17cd0
> R13: ffff8880068be680 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 1ffff11000d17cd0
> ...
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x54/0x80
> ? selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0x26/0x30
> ? rose_bind+0x5b0/0x5b0
> __sys_connect+0x216/0x280
> __x64_sys_connect+0x71/0x80
> do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
>
> This patch adds lock_sock() in rose_kill_by_neigh() in order to
> synchronize with rose_connect() and rose_release().
>
> Meanwhile, this patch adds sock_hold() protected by rose_list_lock
> that could synchronize with rose_remove_socket() in order to mitigate
> UAF bug caused by lock_sock() we add.
>
> What's more, there is no need using rose_neigh_list_lock to protect
> rose_kill_by_neigh(). Because we have already used rose_neigh_list_lock
> to protect the state change of rose_neigh in rose_link_failed(), which
> is well synchronized.
>
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>
> ---
> Changes since v2:
> - v2: Fix refcount leak of sock.
>
> net/rose/af_rose.c | 6 ++++++
> net/rose/rose_route.c | 2 ++
> 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/rose/af_rose.c b/net/rose/af_rose.c
> index bf2d986a6bc..5caa222c490 100644
> --- a/net/rose/af_rose.c
> +++ b/net/rose/af_rose.c
> @@ -169,9 +169,15 @@ void rose_kill_by_neigh(struct rose_neigh *neigh)
> struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
>
> if (rose->neighbour == neigh) {
> + sock_hold(s);
> rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
> rose->neighbour->use--;
> + spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
> + lock_sock(s);
> rose->neighbour = NULL;
> + release_sock(s);
> + spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);

I'm sorry, I likely was not clear enough in my previous reply. This is
broken. If a list is [spin_]lock protected, you can't release the lock,
reacquire it and continue traversing the list from the [now invalid]
same iterator.

e.g. if s is removed from the list, even if the sock is not de-
allocated due to the addtional refcount, the traversing will errnously
stop after this sock, instead of continuing processing the remaining
socks in the list.

A possible alternative, not even build-tested would be:
---
diff --git a/include/net/rose.h b/include/net/rose.h
index 0f0a4ce0fee7..090db11d528f 100644
--- a/include/net/rose.h
+++ b/include/net/rose.h
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ struct rose_sock {
struct rose_facilities_struct facilities;
struct timer_list timer;
struct timer_list idletimer;
+ struct rose_sock *dl_next;
};

#define rose_sk(sk) ((struct rose_sock *)(sk))
diff --git a/net/rose/af_rose.c b/net/rose/af_rose.c
index 5caa222c490e..01f3c50f0921 100644
--- a/net/rose/af_rose.c
+++ b/net/rose/af_rose.c
@@ -162,25 +162,32 @@ static void rose_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
*/
void rose_kill_by_neigh(struct rose_neigh *neigh)
{
- struct sock *s;
+ struct rose_sock *del_list = NULL;
+ struct sock *s, *tmp;

spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
- sk_for_each(s, &rose_list) {
+ sk_for_each_safe(s, tmp, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);

if (rose->neighbour == neigh) {
- sock_hold(s);
- rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
- rose->neighbour->use--;
- spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
- lock_sock(s);
- rose->neighbour = NULL;
- release_sock(s);
- spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
- sock_put(s);
+ __sk_del_node(s);
+ s->dl_next = del_list;
+ del_list = s;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
+
+ while (del_list) {
+ s = del_list;
+ del_list = s->dl_next;
+
+ lock_sock(s);
+ rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
+ rose->neighbour->use--;
+ rose->neighbour = NULL;
+ release_sock(s);
+ sock_put(s);
+ }
}

/*
---
Paolo

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