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Subject[PATCH 4.14 137/237] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <>

commit d97c68d178fbf8aaaf21b69b446f2dfb13909316 upstream.

If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU is set, the RNG initializes using RDRAND.
But, the user can disable (or enable) this behavior by setting
`random.trust_cpu=0/1` on the kernel command line. This allows system
builders to do reasonable things while avoiding howls from tinfoil
hatters. (Or vice versa.)

CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is basically the same thing, but regards
the seed passed via EFI or device tree, which might come from RDRAND or
a TPM or somewhere else. In order to allow distros to more easily enable
this while avoiding those same howls (or vice versa), this commit adds
the corresponding `random.trust_bootloader=0/1` toggle.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <>
Cc: Graham Christensen <>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <>
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
drivers/char/Kconfig | 3 ++-
drivers/char/random.c | 8 +++++++-
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3532,6 +3532,12 @@
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled

+ random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+ [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+ seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options

cec_disable [X86]
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -612,4 +612,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
- only mixes the entropy pool.
\ No newline at end of file
+ only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
+ "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -940,11 +940,17 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz

static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);

* The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
@@ -1152,7 +1158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+ if (trust_bootloader)
add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
add_device_randomness(buf, size);

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