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Subject[PATCH 4.14 163/237] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()
Date
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit cbe89e5a375a51bbb952929b93fa973416fea74e upstream.

It's too hard to keep the batches synchronized, and pointless anyway,
since in !crng_ready(), we're updating the base_crng key really often,
where batching only hurts. So instead, if the crng isn't ready, just
call into get_random_bytes(). At this stage nothing is performance
critical anyhow.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 158 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -233,10 +233,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
*
*********************************************************************/

-enum {
- CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ,
- CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE
-};
+enum { CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ };

static struct {
u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
@@ -258,6 +255,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs

/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+/* Used by crng_make_state() to extract a new seed when crng_init==0. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);

/*
* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a
@@ -382,17 +381,20 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
/*
* For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
* then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
- * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
- * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init.
+ * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+ * when crng_init==0.
*/
if (!crng_ready()) {
bool ready;

spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
ready = crng_ready();
- if (!ready)
+ if (!ready) {
+ if (crng_init == 0)
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
random_data, random_data_len);
+ }
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
if (!ready)
return;
@@ -433,50 +435,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
local_irq_restore(flags);
}

-/*
- * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly
- * into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is,
- * generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early
- * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than
- * nothing.
- *
- * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented.
- * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),
- * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
- * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).
- */
-static void crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
-{
- static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
- struct blake2s_state hash;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- return;
- }
-
- blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
- blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);
- blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
-
- if (account) {
- crng_init_cnt += min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);
- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- ++base_crng.generation;
- crng_init = 1;
- }
- }
-
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-
- if (crng_init == 1)
- pr_notice("fast init done\n");
-}
-
static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
@@ -622,6 +580,11 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)

warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);

+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
local_irq_save(flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);

@@ -655,6 +618,11 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)

warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);

+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
local_irq_save(flags);
batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);

@@ -776,7 +744,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);

enum {
POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
- POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
+ POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* No point in settling for less. */
+ POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS = POOL_MIN_BITS / 2
};

/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */
@@ -813,24 +782,6 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}

-static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
-{
- unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
-
- if (!nbits)
- return;
-
- add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
- do {
- orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
- entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
- } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
-
- if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
- crng_reseed();
-}
-
/*
* This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
* as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
@@ -896,6 +847,33 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
return true;
}

+static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+{
+ unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!nbits)
+ return;
+
+ add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
+
+ do {
+ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+ entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
+
+ if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
+ crng_reseed();
+ else if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy_count >= POOL_FAST_INIT_BITS)) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (crng_init == 0) {
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_init = 1;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ }
+}
+

/**********************************************************************
*
@@ -938,9 +916,9 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
* entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
* block until more entropy is needed.
*
- * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or
- * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration
- * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*
* add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
* inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
@@ -1020,9 +998,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b
unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
unsigned long flags;

- if (crng_init == 0 && size)
- crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false);
-
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
@@ -1138,12 +1113,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk
void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
size_t entropy)
{
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0 && entropy < POOL_MIN_BITS)) {
- crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);
- mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
- return;
- }
-
/*
* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
* We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
@@ -1151,7 +1120,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const vo
* CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
*/
wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
- !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
+ kthread_should_stop() ||
input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
@@ -1160,17 +1129,14 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const vo
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);

/*
- * Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
- * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
- * it would be regarded as device data.
- * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*/
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
if (trust_bootloader)
- add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
- else
- add_device_randomness(buf, size);
+ credit_entropy_bits(size * 8);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);

@@ -1270,13 +1236,8 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(str
fast_pool->last = jiffies;
local_irq_enable();

- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true);
- mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
- } else {
- mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
- credit_entropy_bits(1);
- }
+ mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ credit_entropy_bits(1);

memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
}
@@ -1298,8 +1259,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
return;

- if (new_count < 64 && (!time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ) ||
- unlikely(crng_init == 0)))
+ if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
return;

if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))

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