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Subject[PATCH 4.9 134/264] random: group initialization wait functions
Date
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 5f1bb112006b104b3e2a1e1b39bbb9b2617581e6 upstream.

This pulls all of the readiness waiting-focused functions into the first
labeled section.

No functional changes.

Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 1066 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
1 file changed, 527 insertions(+), 539 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -202,126 +202,144 @@
#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>

-enum {
- POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
- POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
-};
-
-/*
- * Static global variables
- */
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *
+ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
+ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
+ * is ready for safe consumption.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/

/*
* crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized
* 1 --> Initialized
* 2 --> Initialized from input_pool
*
- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
+ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
* its value (from 0->1->2).
*/
static int crng_init = 0;
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);

+/* Control how we warn userspace. */
static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
-
static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
-
module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");

-/**********************************************************************
- *
- * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
+/*
+ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
*
- **********************************************************************/
-
-static struct {
- struct blake2s_state hash;
- spinlock_t lock;
- unsigned int entropy_count;
-} input_pool = {
- .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
- BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
- BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
- .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
-};
-
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * false if the input pool has not been seeded.
+ */
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+ return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);

-static void crng_reseed(void);
+/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);

/*
- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
- * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
+ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
*/
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
{
- blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
-}
+ if (likely(crng_ready()))
+ return 0;

-static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
+ do {
+ int ret;
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;

- spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-}
+ try_to_generate_entropy();
+ } while (!crng_ready());

-struct fast_pool {
- union {
- u32 pool32[4];
- u64 pool64[2];
- };
- unsigned long last;
- u16 reg_idx;
- u8 count;
-};
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);

/*
- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
- * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
+ * pool is initialised.
+ *
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
+ * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
*/
-static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4])
+int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
{
- u32 a = pool[0], b = pool[1];
- u32 c = pool[2], d = pool[3];
+ struct module *owner;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int err = -EALREADY;

- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return err;

- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ owner = rdy->owner;
+ if (!try_module_get(owner))
+ return -ENOENT;

- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (crng_ready())
+ goto out;

- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ owner = NULL;

- pool[0] = a; pool[1] = b;
- pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d;
+ list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+ module_put(owner);
+
+ return err;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+
+/*
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ */
+void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct module *owner = NULL;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
+ list_del_init(&rdy->list);
+ owner = rdy->owner;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+
+ module_put(owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);

static void process_random_ready_list(void)
{
@@ -339,27 +357,51 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
}

-static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
+ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
+
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
{
- unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ const bool print_once = false;
+#else
+ static bool print_once __read_mostly;
+#endif

- if (!nbits)
+ if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
+ (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
return;
-
- add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
-
- do {
- orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
- entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
- } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
-
- if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
- crng_reseed();
+ WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ print_once = true;
+#endif
+ if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
+ printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
+ func_name, caller, crng_init);
}

+
/*********************************************************************
*
- * CRNG using CHACHA20
+ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+ *
+ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
+ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
+ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
+ *
+ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
+ *
+ * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ * u32 get_random_u32()
+ * u64 get_random_u64()
+ * unsigned int get_random_int()
+ * unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *
+ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
+ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
+ * a read from /dev/urandom. The integer family of functions may be
+ * higher performance for one-off random integers, because they do a
+ * bit of buffering.
*
*********************************************************************/

@@ -386,123 +428,14 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs
.generation = ULONG_MAX
};

-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
-
-/*
- * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
- * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
- * bytes processed from cp.
- */
-static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp;
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
- return 0;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- return 0;
- }
- while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src;
- src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
- }
- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- ++base_crng.generation;
- crng_init = 1;
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- if (crng_init == 1)
- pr_notice("fast init done\n");
- return ret;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
- for_each_node(i)
- kfree(pool[i]);
- kfree(pool);
- }
-}
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
-
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- struct crng_state **pool;
- int nid = numa_node_id();
-
- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
- if (pool && pool[nid])
- return pool[nid];
-
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-#else
-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-#endif
+/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
+static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);

/*
- * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
- * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
- * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
- * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
- * crng_fast_load().
- *
- * So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally,
- * we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be
- * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very
- * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
+ * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a
+ * sufficient amount of entropy available, in order to mitigate bruteforcing
+ * of newly added bits.
*/
-static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct blake2s_state hash;
-
- blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
-
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
- return;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
- return;
- }
-
- blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
- blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len);
- blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
-
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
-}
-
static void crng_reseed(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -552,13 +485,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
}

/*
- * The general form here is based on a "fast key erasure RNG" from
- * <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>. It generates a ChaCha
- * block using the provided key, and then immediately overwites that
- * key with half the block. It returns the resultant ChaCha state to the
- * user, along with the second half of the block containing 32 bytes of
- * random data that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than
- * 32.
+ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
+ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
+ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
+ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
+ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
*/
static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE],
u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)],
@@ -645,6 +576,126 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
local_irq_restore(flags);
}

+/*
+ * This function is for crng_init == 0 only.
+ *
+ * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
+ * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
+ * bytes processed from cp.
+ */
+static size_t crng_fast_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
+{
+ static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp;
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
+ return 0;
+ if (crng_init != 0) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
+ base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt % sizeof(base_crng.key)] ^= *src;
+ src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
+ }
+ if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
+ ++base_crng.generation;
+ crng_init = 1;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (crng_init == 1)
+ pr_notice("fast init done\n");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is for crng_init == 0 only.
+ *
+ * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
+ * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
+ * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
+ * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
+ * crng_fast_load().
+ *
+ * So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally,
+ * we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be
+ * something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very
+ * well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
+ */
+static void crng_slow_load(const void *cp, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct blake2s_state hash;
+
+ blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+
+ if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags))
+ return;
+ if (crng_init != 0) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ blake2s_update(&hash, cp, len);
+ blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
+ u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!nbytes)
+ return;
+
+ len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
+ nbytes -= len;
+ buf += len;
+
+ while (nbytes) {
+ if (nbytes < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
+ nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
+ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+ * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
+ * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
+ */
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ static void *previous;
+
+ warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+ _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+
static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
@@ -692,6 +743,265 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
return ret;
}

+/*
+ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
+ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
+ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
+ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
+ */
+struct batched_entropy {
+ union {
+ /*
+ * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the
+ * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full
+ * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase
+ * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the
+ * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE.
+ */
+ u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))];
+ u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))];
+ };
+ unsigned long generation;
+ unsigned int position;
+};
+
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
+ .position = UINT_MAX
+};
+
+u64 get_random_u64(void)
+{
+ u64 ret;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct batched_entropy *batch;
+ static void *previous;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
+
+ warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
+
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
+ if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) ||
+ next_gen != batch->generation) {
+ _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64));
+ batch->position = 0;
+ batch->generation = next_gen;
+ }
+
+ ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position];
+ batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0;
+ ++batch->position;
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
+ .position = UINT_MAX
+};
+
+u32 get_random_u32(void)
+{
+ u32 ret;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct batched_entropy *batch;
+ static void *previous;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
+
+ warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
+
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
+ if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) ||
+ next_gen != batch->generation) {
+ _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32));
+ batch->position = 0;
+ batch->generation = next_gen;
+ }
+
+ ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position];
+ batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0;
+ ++batch->position;
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
+
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ * random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+ range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+ }
+
+ if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+ range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+ range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (range == 0)
+ return start;
+
+ return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
+ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
+ * bytes filled in.
+ */
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ size_t left = nbytes;
+ u8 *p = buf;
+
+ while (left) {
+ unsigned long v;
+ size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
+ break;
+
+ memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
+ p += chunk;
+ left -= chunk;
+ }
+
+ return nbytes - left;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
+
+enum {
+ POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
+ POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Static global variables
+ */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
+ * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+static struct {
+ struct blake2s_state hash;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ unsigned int entropy_count;
+} input_pool = {
+ .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
+ .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+};
+
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+
+static void crng_reseed(void);
+
+/*
+ * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
+ * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
+ * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
+ */
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
+}
+
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+}
+
+struct fast_pool {
+ union {
+ u32 pool32[4];
+ u64 pool64[2];
+ };
+ unsigned long last;
+ u16 reg_idx;
+ u8 count;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
+ * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
+ * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ */
+static void fast_mix(u32 pool[4])
+{
+ u32 a = pool[0], b = pool[1];
+ u32 c = pool[2], d = pool[3];
+
+ a += b; c += d;
+ b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
+ d ^= a; b ^= c;
+
+ a += b; c += d;
+ b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
+ d ^= a; b ^= c;
+
+ a += b; c += d;
+ b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
+ d ^= a; b ^= c;
+
+ a += b; c += d;
+ b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
+ d ^= a; b ^= c;
+
+ pool[0] = a; pool[1] = b;
+ pool[2] = c; pool[3] = d;
+}
+
+static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
+{
+ unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;
+
+ if (!nbits)
+ return;
+
+ add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
+
+ do {
+ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
+ entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);
+
+ if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
+ crng_reseed();
+}
+
/*********************************************************************
*
* Entropy input management
@@ -959,80 +1269,6 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, siz
return true;
}

-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
- _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
-
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- const bool print_once = false;
-#else
- static bool print_once __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
- if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
- (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
- return;
- WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- print_once = true;
-#endif
- if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
- pr_notice("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
- func_name, caller, crng_init);
-}
-
-/*
- * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
- * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
- * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
- * at any point prior.
- */
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
- u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
- size_t len;
-
- if (!nbytes)
- return;
-
- len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
- crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
- nbytes -= len;
- buf += len;
-
- while (nbytes) {
- if (nbytes < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- break;
- }
-
- chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
- if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
- ++chacha_state[13];
- nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
-
- memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
-}
-
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
- _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-
/*
* Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
* jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1082,134 +1318,6 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
}

-/*
- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
- *
- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
- */
-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
-{
- if (likely(crng_ready()))
- return 0;
-
- do {
- int ret;
- ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
- if (ret)
- return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
-
- try_to_generate_entropy();
- } while (!crng_ready());
-
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
-
-/*
- * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
- * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
- * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
- * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
- *
- * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- * false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
- */
-bool rng_is_initialized(void)
-{
- return crng_ready();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
-
-/*
- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
- * pool is initialised.
- *
- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
- * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
- * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
- */
-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
- struct module *owner;
- unsigned long flags;
- int err = -EALREADY;
-
- if (crng_ready())
- return err;
-
- owner = rdy->owner;
- if (!try_module_get(owner))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (crng_ready())
- goto out;
-
- owner = NULL;
-
- list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
- err = 0;
-
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-
- module_put(owner);
-
- return err;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
-
-/*
- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
- */
-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct module *owner = NULL;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- owner = rdy->owner;
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
-
- module_put(owner);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
-
-/*
- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
- * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
- * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
- * bytes filled in.
- */
-size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- size_t left = nbytes;
- u8 *p = buf;
-
- while (left) {
- unsigned long v;
- size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
-
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
-
- memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
- p += chunk;
- left -= chunk;
- }
-
- return nbytes - left;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-
static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
{
@@ -1560,126 +1668,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
};
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */

-struct batched_entropy {
- union {
- /*
- * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the
- * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full
- * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase
- * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the
- * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE.
- */
- u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))];
- u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))];
- };
- unsigned long generation;
- unsigned int position;
-};
-
-/*
- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
- * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
- * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
- * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
- .position = UINT_MAX
-};
-
-u64 get_random_u64(void)
-{
- u64 ret;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
- static void *previous;
- unsigned long next_gen;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
- local_irq_save(flags);
- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
-
- next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
- if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) ||
- next_gen != batch->generation) {
- _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64));
- batch->position = 0;
- batch->generation = next_gen;
- }
-
- ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position];
- batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0;
- ++batch->position;
- local_irq_restore(flags);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
- .position = UINT_MAX
-};
-
-u32 get_random_u32(void)
-{
- u32 ret;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
- static void *previous;
- unsigned long next_gen;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
- local_irq_save(flags);
- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
-
- next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
- if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) ||
- next_gen != batch->generation) {
- _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32));
- batch->position = 0;
- batch->generation = next_gen;
- }
-
- ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position];
- batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0;
- ++batch->position;
- local_irq_restore(flags);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
-
-/**
- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
- * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
- * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
- * random address must fall.
- *
- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
- *
- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
- * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
- *
- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
- * @start is returned.
- */
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
-{
- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
- range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
- }
-
- if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
- range = ULONG_MAX - start;
-
- range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
-
- if (range == 0)
- return start;
-
- return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
* Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
* when our pool is full.

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