Messages in this thread | | | From | "Kalra, Ashish" <> | Subject | RE: [PATCH v2] crypto: ccp - Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak | Date | Mon, 16 May 2022 16:02:27 +0000 |
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[AMD Official Use Only - General]
Hello Peter,
-----Original Message----- From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> Sent: Monday, May 16, 2022 10:53 AM To: Allen, John <John.Allen@amd.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>; Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>; Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>; Lendacky, Thomas <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>; Kalra, Ashish <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>; LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>; Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>; David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>; stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] crypto: ccp - Use kzalloc for sev ioctl interfaces to prevent kernel memory leak
On Mon, May 16, 2022 at 8:46 AM John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> wrote: > > For some sev ioctl interfaces, input may be passed that is less than > or equal to SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE, but larger than the data that PSP > firmware returns. In this case, kmalloc will allocate memory that is > the size of the input rather than the size of the data. Since PSP > firmware doesn't fully overwrite the buffer, the sev ioctl interfaces > with the issue may return uninitialized slab memory. > > Currently, all of the ioctl interfaces in the ccp driver are safe, but > to prevent future problems, change all ioctl interfaces that allocate > memory with kmalloc to use kzalloc. > > Fixes: e799035609e15 ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl > command") > Fixes: 76a2b524a4b1d ("crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT > ioctl command") > Fixes: d6112ea0cb344 ("crypto: ccp - introduce SEV_GET_ID2 command") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com> > Suggested-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> > Suggested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> > Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> > --- > v2: > - Add fixes tags and CC stable@vger.kernel.org > ---
>static int sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp) { struct sev_user_data_status data; int ret;
>ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, &data, &argp->error); if (ret) return ret;
>if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &data, sizeof(data))) ret = -EFAULT;
>return ret; >}
>Would it be safer to memset @data here to all zeros too?
It will be, but this command/function is safe as firmware will fill in the whole buffer here with the PLATFORM STATUS data retuned to the user.
Thanks, Ashish
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