Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 11 May 2022 07:44:41 -0700 | From | Kees Cook <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check |
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On May 11, 2022 1:02:45 AM PDT, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: >On Tue, May 10, 2022 at 08:00:38PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Tue, May 10, 2022 at 12:46:48PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote: >> > On Sun, May 08, 2022 at 09:17:01PM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote: >> > > On 27.04.2022 20:31, Mark Rutland wrote: >> > > > In __stackleak_erase() we check that the `erase_low` value derived from >> > > > `current->lowest_stack` is above the lowest legitimate stack pointer >> > > > value, but this is already enforced by stackleak_track_stack() when >> > > > recording the lowest stack value. >> > > > >> > > > Remove the redundant check. >> > > > >> > > > There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. >> > > >> > > Mark, I can't agree here. I think this check is important. >> > > The performance profit from dropping it is less than the confidence decrease :) >> > > >> > > With this check, if the 'lowest_stack' value is corrupted, stackleak doesn't >> > > overwrite some wrong kernel memory, but simply clears the whole thread >> > > stack, which is safe behavior. >> > >> > If you feel strongly about it, I can restore the check, but I struggle to >> > believe that it's worthwhile. The `lowest_stack` value lives in the >> > task_struct, and if you have the power to corrupt that you have the power to do >> > much more interesting things. >> > >> > If we do restore it, I'd like to add a big fat comment explaining the >> > rationale (i.e. that it only matter if someone could corrupt >> > `current->lowest_stack`, as otherwise that's guarnateed to be within bounds). >> >> Yeah, let's restore it and add the comment. While I do agree it's likely >> that such an corruption would likely mean an attacker had significant >> control over kernel memory already, it is not uncommon that an attack >> only has a limited index from a given address, etc. Or some manipulation >> is possible via weird gadgets, etc. It's unlikely, but not impossible, >> and a bounds-check for that value is cheap compared to the rest of the >> work happening. :) > >Fair enough; I can go spin a patch restoring this. I'm somewhat unhappy with >silently fixing that up, though -- IMO it'd be better to BUG() or similar in >that case.
I share your desires, and this was exactly what Alexander originally proposed, but Linus rejected it violently. :( https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFy6jNLsywVYdGp83AMrXBo_P-pkjkphPGrO=82SPKCpLQ@mail.gmail.com/
-- Kees Cook
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