Messages in this thread | | | From | Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <> | Subject | RE: [PATCH v8 5/9] hisi_acc_vfio_pci: Restrict access to VF dev BAR2 migration region | Date | Tue, 8 Mar 2022 08:33:16 +0000 |
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Hi Kevin,
> -----Original Message----- > From: Tian, Kevin [mailto:kevin.tian@intel.com] > Sent: 08 March 2022 06:23 > To: Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>; > kvm@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; > linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org; alex.williamson@redhat.com; jgg@nvidia.com; > cohuck@redhat.com; mgurtovoy@nvidia.com; yishaih@nvidia.com; Linuxarm > <linuxarm@huawei.com>; liulongfang <liulongfang@huawei.com>; Zengtao (B) > <prime.zeng@hisilicon.com>; Jonathan Cameron > <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>; Wangzhou (B) <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com> > Subject: RE: [PATCH v8 5/9] hisi_acc_vfio_pci: Restrict access to VF dev BAR2 > migration region > > Hi, Shameer, > > > From: Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com> > > Sent: Friday, March 4, 2022 7:01 AM > > > > HiSilicon ACC VF device BAR2 region consists of both functional > > register space and migration control register space. From a > > security point of view, it's not advisable to export the migration > > control region to Guest. > > > > Hence, introduce a separate struct vfio_device_ops for migration > > support which will override the ioctl/read/write/mmap methods to > > hide the migration region and limit the access only to the > > functional register space. > > > > This will be used in subsequent patches when we add migration > > support to the driver. > > As a security concern the migration control region should be always > disabled regardless of whether migration support is added to the > driver for such device... It sounds like we should first fix this security > hole for acc device assignment and then add the migration support > atop (at least organize the series in this way).
By exposing the migration BAR region, there is a possibility that a malicious Guest can prevent migration from happening by manipulating the migration BAR region. I don't think there are any other security concerns now especially since we only support the STOP_COPY state. And the approach has been that we only restrict this if migration support is enabled. I think I can change the above "security concern" description to "malicious Guest can prevent migration" to make it more clear.
Hope this is fine.
Thanks, Shameer
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