Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 7 Feb 2022 13:43:31 -0500 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v10 12/27] ima: Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for ns_capable() | From | Stefan Berger <> |
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On 2/6/22 12:20, Stefan Berger wrote: > > On 2/5/22 00:58, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: >> On Tue, Feb 01, 2022 at 03:37:20PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: >>> Define mac_admin_ns_capable() as a wrapper for the combined >>> ns_capable() >>> checks on CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_ADMIN in a user namespace. Return >>> true on the check if either capability or both are available. >>> >>> Use mac_admin_ns_capable() in place of capable(SYS_ADMIN). This will >>> allow >>> an IMA namespace to read the policy with only CAP_MAC_ADMIN, which has >>> less privileges than CAP_SYS_ADMIN. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@huawei.com> >>> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> >>> --- >>> include/linux/capability.h | 6 ++++++ >>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++++++ >>> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 ++++- >>> 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h >>> index 65efb74c3585..991579178f32 100644 >>> --- a/include/linux/capability.h >>> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h >>> @@ -270,6 +270,12 @@ static inline bool >>> checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) >>> ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); >>> } >>> +static inline bool mac_admin_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns) >>> +{ >>> + return ns_capable(ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN) || >>> + ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); >> Do you care about audit warnings? If the task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN but >> not CAP_MAC_ADMIN, is it desirable that selinux_capable() will audit the >> CAP_MAC_ADMIN failure? > > Good point. I will switch both to ns_capable_noaudit() so that the > user cannot provoke unnecessary audit message.
Actually, I will only change the MAC_ADMIN to not do auditing and not change the auditing behavior related to SYS_ADMIN.
Stefan
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