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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 1/3] firmware: Add boot information to sysfs
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On 2022-02-03 11:53, Joel Stanley wrote:
> Machines often have firmware that perform some action before Linux is
> loaded. It's useful to know how this firmware is configured, so create a
> sysfs directory and some properties that a system can choose to expose
> to describe how the system was started.
>
> Currently the intended use describes five files, relating to hardware
> root of trust configuration.
>
> These properties are populated by platform code at startup. Using fixed
> values is suitable as the state that the system booted in will not
> change after firmware has handed over.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
> ---
> v2:
> - Rewrite so properties are present in common code and are exposed based
> on the is_visible callback.
> - Use sysfs_emit
> ---
> .../ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-bootinfo | 43 +++++++++
> drivers/base/firmware.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/firmware_bootinfo.h | 22 +++++
> 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-bootinfo
> create mode 100644 include/linux/firmware_bootinfo.h
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-bootinfo b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-bootinfo
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..cd6c42316345
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-bootinfo
> @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
> +What: /sys/firmware/bootinfo/*
> +Date: Jan 2022
> +Description:
> + A system can expose information about how it was started in
> + this directory.
> +
> + This information is agnostic as to the firmware implementation.
> +
> + A system may expose a subset of these properties as applicable.
> +
> +
> +What: /sys/firmware/bootinfo/secure_boot
> +Date: Jan 2022
> +Description:
> + Indicates the system was started with secure boot enabled in
> + the firmware.
> +
> +
> +What: /sys/firmware/bootinfo/abr_image
> +Date: Jan 2022
> +Description:
> + Indicates the system was started from the alternate image
> + loaded from an Alternate Boot Region. Often this is a result of
> + the primary firmware image failing to start the system.
> +
> +
> +What: /sys/firmware/bootinfo/low_security_key
> +Date: Jan 2022
> +Description:
> + Indicates the system's secure boot was verified with a low
> + security or development key.
> +
> +What: /sys/firmware/bootinfo/otp_protected
> +Date: Jan 2022
> +Description:
> + Indicates the system's boot configuration region is write
> + protected and cannot be modified.
> +
> +What: /sys/firmware/bootinfo/uart_boot
> +Date: Jan 2022
> +Description:
> + Indicates the system firmware was loaded from a UART instead of
> + an internal boot device.

I'd be concerned about how well details like "uart_boot" and "abr_image"
scale beyond one SoC family from one vendor. The combinatorial explosion
of possible boot configurations across Linux-capable SoCs and firmware
in general is larger than I'd care to imagine, even before considering
that the nuances don't necessarily stop there - e.g. whether a given
storage interface is hard-wired or user-accessible is not a fixed
property on many SoCs, and even a socketed SD card might be "trusted" if
a board is deployed in a product with a sealed enclosure.

Cheers,
Robin.

> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware.c b/drivers/base/firmware.c
> index 8dff940e0db9..24b931232eb2 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware.c
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <linux/module.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/device.h>
> +#include <linux/firmware_bootinfo.h>
>
> #include "base.h"
>
> @@ -24,3 +25,92 @@ int __init firmware_init(void)
> return -ENOMEM;
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * Exposes attributes documented in Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-bootinfo
> + */
> +static struct bootinfo bootinfo;
> +
> +static ssize_t abr_image_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bootinfo.abr_image.val);
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(abr_image);
> +
> +static ssize_t low_security_key_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bootinfo.low_security_key.val);
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(low_security_key);
> +
> +static ssize_t otp_protected_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bootinfo.otp_protected.val);
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(otp_protected);
> +
> +static ssize_t secure_boot_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bootinfo.secure_boot.val);
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(secure_boot);
> +
> +static ssize_t uart_boot_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", bootinfo.uart_boot.val);
> +}
> +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(uart_boot);
> +
> +#define ATTR_ENABLED(a) ((attr == &dev_attr_##a.attr) && bootinfo.a.en)
> +
> +static umode_t bootinfo_attr_mode(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int index)
> +{
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(abr_image))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(otp_protected))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(low_security_key))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(otp_protected))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(low_security_key))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(secure_boot))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + if (ATTR_ENABLED(uart_boot))
> + return 0444;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static struct attribute *bootinfo_attrs[] = {
> + &dev_attr_abr_image.attr,
> + &dev_attr_low_security_key.attr,
> + &dev_attr_otp_protected.attr,
> + &dev_attr_secure_boot.attr,
> + &dev_attr_uart_boot.attr,
> + NULL,
> +};
> +
> +static const struct attribute_group bootinfo_attr_group = {
> + .attrs = bootinfo_attrs,
> + .is_visible = bootinfo_attr_mode,
> +};
> +
> +int __init firmware_bootinfo_init(struct bootinfo *bootinfo_init)
> +{
> + struct kobject *kobj = kobject_create_and_add("bootinfo", firmware_kobj);
> + if (!kobj)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + memcpy(&bootinfo, bootinfo_init, sizeof(bootinfo));
> +
> + return sysfs_create_group(kobj, &bootinfo_attr_group);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(firmware_bootinfo_init);
> diff --git a/include/linux/firmware_bootinfo.h b/include/linux/firmware_bootinfo.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..3fe630b061b9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/firmware_bootinfo.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
> +/* Copyright 2022 IBM Corp. */
> +
> +#include <linux/sysfs.h>
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +
> +#define BOOTINFO_SET(b, n, v) b.n.en = true; b.n.val = v
> +
> +struct bootinfo_entry {
> + bool en;
> + bool val;
> +};
> +
> +struct bootinfo {
> + struct bootinfo_entry abr_image;
> + struct bootinfo_entry low_security_key;
> + struct bootinfo_entry otp_protected;
> + struct bootinfo_entry secure_boot;
> + struct bootinfo_entry uart_boot;
> +};
> +
> +int __init firmware_bootinfo_init(struct bootinfo *bootinfo_init);
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