Messages in this thread | | | From | Oded Gabbay <> | Date | Wed, 2 Feb 2022 09:50:18 +0200 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] habanalabs: fix potential spectre v1 gadgets |
| |
On Tue, Feb 1, 2022 at 7:25 PM Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems> wrote: > > It appears like nr could be a Spectre v1 gadget as it's supplied by a > user and used as an array index. Prevent the contents > of kernel memory from being leaked to userspace via speculative > execution by using array_index_nospec. > > Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems> > --- > drivers/misc/habanalabs/common/habanalabs_ioctl.c | 3 +++ > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/misc/habanalabs/common/habanalabs_ioctl.c b/drivers/misc/habanalabs/common/habanalabs_ioctl.c > index 3ba3a8ffda3e..c1cdf712a10d 100644 > --- a/drivers/misc/habanalabs/common/habanalabs_ioctl.c > +++ b/drivers/misc/habanalabs/common/habanalabs_ioctl.c > @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ > #include <linux/fs.h> > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > +#include <linux/nospec.h> > > static u32 hl_debug_struct_size[HL_DEBUG_OP_TIMESTAMP + 1] = { > [HL_DEBUG_OP_ETR] = sizeof(struct hl_debug_params_etr), > @@ -849,6 +850,7 @@ long hl_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > } > > if ((nr >= HL_COMMAND_START) && (nr < HL_COMMAND_END)) { > + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, HL_COMMAND_END-1); > ioctl = &hl_ioctls[nr]; > } else { > dev_err(hdev->dev, "invalid ioctl: pid=%d, nr=0x%02x\n", > @@ -872,6 +874,7 @@ long hl_ioctl_control(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) > } > > if (nr == _IOC_NR(HL_IOCTL_INFO)) { > + nr = array_index_nospec(nr, _IOC_NR(HL_IOCTL_INFO)); > ioctl = &hl_ioctls_control[nr]; > } else { > dev_err(hdev->dev_ctrl, "invalid ioctl: pid=%d, nr=0x%02x\n", > -- > 2.27.0 >
Thanks for the patch. I'm going to run this through our CI and if nothing breaks I'll merge it to our -next branch.
Oded
| |