| Date | Sun, 13 Feb 2022 07:54:37 +0100 | From | Dominik Brodowski <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 05/10] random: group crng functions |
| |
> @@ -724,54 +563,433 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], > local_unlock_irqrestore(&crngs.lock, flags); > } > > -static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) > +/* > + * This function is for crng_init < 2 only.
No, it's for crng_init == 0 only.
> +/* > + * This function is for crng_init < 2 only.
Same here.
> + * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random > + * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
/dev/random
> +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
Sidenote: We should get rid of the sole caller of that function, and then of this function. AFAICS, using get_random_bytes() (once rand_initialize() has been called) should never be less secure than get_random_bytes_arch() IFF arch_get_random_long() exists -- which is what the sole caller seems to be interested in.
Otherwise, all looks good. Thanks,
Dominik
|