Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 5 Dec 2022 08:57:48 +0100 | Subject | Re: [syzbot] WARNING in nci_add_new_protocol | From | Krzysztof Kozlowski <> |
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On 02/12/2022 22:36, Kees Cook wrote: > On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 02:26:30PM -0800, syzbot wrote: >> Hello, >> >> syzbot found the following issue on: >> >> HEAD commit: 4312098baf37 Merge tag 'spi-fix-v6.1-rc6' of git://git.ker.. >> git tree: upstream >> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12e25bb5880000 >> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=b1129081024ee340 >> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=210e196cef4711b65139 >> compiler: arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 >> userspace arch: arm >> >> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. >> >> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: >> Reported-by: syzbot+210e196cef4711b65139@syzkaller.appspotmail.com >> >> ------------[ cut here ]------------ >> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7843 at net/nfc/nci/ntf.c:260 nci_add_new_protocol+0x268/0x30c net/nfc/nci/ntf.c:260 >> memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 129) of single field "target->sensf_res" at net/nfc/nci/ntf.c:260 (size 18) > > This looks like a legitimate overflow flaw to me. Likely introduced with > commit 019c4fbaa790 ("NFC: Add NCI multiple targets support"). > > These appear to be explicitly filling fixed-size arrays: > > struct nfc_target { > u32 idx; > u32 supported_protocols; > u16 sens_res; > u8 sel_res; > u8 nfcid1_len; > u8 nfcid1[NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE]; > u8 nfcid2_len; > u8 nfcid2[NFC_NFCID2_MAXSIZE]; > u8 sensb_res_len; > u8 sensb_res[NFC_SENSB_RES_MAXSIZE]; > u8 sensf_res_len; > u8 sensf_res[NFC_SENSF_RES_MAXSIZE]; > u8 hci_reader_gate; > u8 logical_idx; > u8 is_iso15693; > u8 iso15693_dsfid; > u8 iso15693_uid[NFC_ISO15693_UID_MAXSIZE]; > }; > > static int nci_add_new_protocol(..., struct nfc_target *target, ...) > { > ... > } else if (rf_tech_and_mode == NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE) { > nfcb_poll = (struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcb_poll *)params; > > target->sensb_res_len = nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len; > if (target->sensb_res_len > 0) { > memcpy(target->sensb_res, nfcb_poll->sensb_res, > target->sensb_res_len); > } > } else if (rf_tech_and_mode == NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE) { > nfcf_poll = (struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcf_poll *)params; > > target->sensf_res_len = nfcf_poll->sensf_res_len; > if (target->sensf_res_len > 0) { > memcpy(target->sensf_res, nfcf_poll->sensf_res, > target->sensf_res_len); > } > } else if (rf_tech_and_mode == NCI_NFC_V_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE) { > nfcv_poll = (struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcv_poll *)params; > > target->is_iso15693 = 1; > target->iso15693_dsfid = nfcv_poll->dsfid; > memcpy(target->iso15693_uid, nfcv_poll->uid, NFC_ISO15693_UID_MAXSIZE); > } > ... > > But the sizes are unbounds-checked, which means the buffers can be > overwritten (as seen with the syzkaller report). > > Perhaps this to fix it? > > diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c > index 282c51051dcc..3a79f07bfea7 100644 > --- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c > +++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c > @@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ static int nci_add_new_protocol(struct nci_dev *ndev, > target->sens_res = nfca_poll->sens_res; > target->sel_res = nfca_poll->sel_res; > target->nfcid1_len = nfca_poll->nfcid1_len; > + if (target->nfcid1_len > ARRAY_SIZE(target->target->nfcid1)) > + return -EPROTO;
Or truncate (copy up to size of array) but both solutions look fine to me.
>
Best regards, Krzysztof
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