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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory
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On 11/6/22 21:10, Guorui Yu wrote:
>> Without ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE, a #VE can occur on basically any
>> instruction.  We call those kinds of exceptions "paranoid entry" points.
>>   They need special handling like the NMI or #MC handlers.
>>
>> I'd be happy to look at a patch that does the MMIO path check *and*
>> turns the #VE handler into a robust entry point.
>>
>> Bonus points if you can do ~5 lines of C like the approach in this
>> thread.
>
> Yes, there is a fix to satify your requirement and get the bouns points 😄
>
> Please refer to
> https://github.com/intel/tdx/commit/f045b0d52a5f7d8bf66cd4410307d05a90523f10
>
> case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
> + if (!(ve->gpa & tdx_shared_mask())) {
> + panic("#VE due to access to unaccepted memory. "
> + "GPA: %#llx\n", ve->gpa);
> + }
> +
> /* original from Kirill and Kuppuswamy */
>
> It's already there, but it just didn't get into the main branch.

Could you explain how that prevents the #VE from occurring in the
"syscall gap" or in a place where the kernel is running with the user
GSBASE value?

It doesn't as far as I can tell. You need the SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for
that.

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