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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/3] x86/speculation: Support Automatic IBRS
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On 11/11/22 6:40 AM, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 11, 2022 at 01:09:37PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 04:39:02PM -0600, Kim Phillips wrote:
>>> I've started a version that has AUTOIBRS reuse SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS
>>> spectre_v2_mitigation enum, but, so far, it's change to bugs.c
>>> looks bigger: 58 lines changed vs. 34 (see below).
>>
>> It can be smaller. You simply do:
>>
>> if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
>> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
>>
>> and the rest should just work - see below.
>>
>> And yes, as Peter says, when the user requests something, the user
>> should get it. No matter whether it makes sense or not.

OK & thanks.

>> @@ -1474,11 +1477,19 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>> break;
>>
>> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
>> - mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
>> + pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_AMD_MSG);
>> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
>> + } else
>> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
>> break;
>>
>> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
>> - mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
>> + pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_AMD_MSG);
>> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
>> + } else
>> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
>> break;
>> }
>>
>
> I am confused here. Isn't the agreement that the user should get what they
> asked for? That is, instead of warning and changing the mode to
> SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS, the kernel should still use lfence or retpoline as requested?
>
> The point of those options was to protect against Branch History Injection
> attacks and Intra-Mode Branch Target Injection attacks. The first one might not
> affect the CPUs that support AUTOIBRS, though we haven't heard that.
>
> The second one (IMBTI) is very likely still possible with AUTOIBRS and
> retpolines should still protect against those attacks. So users who want to be
> paranoid should still be able to opt for "eibrs,retpoline" and have retpolines
> enabled.

I've removed the above and have the complete diff below. It includes patch 1/3 and
drops 3/3 for now due to Jim Mattson's comments. After some more testing, I'll
resubmit.

Thanks,

Kim


diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index a465d5242774..b260a36dc3ef 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5698,9 +5698,10 @@
retpoline,generic - Retpolines
retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch
retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence
- eibrs - enhanced IBRS
- eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
- eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+ eibrs - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+ autoibrs - Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+ eibrs,retpoline - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+ eibrs,lfence - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel

Not specifying this option is equivalent to
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 97669aaf1202..ec9a4eb8e7b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@

/* CPU types for specific tunings: */
#define X86_FEATURE_K8 ( 3*32+ 4) /* "" Opteron, Athlon64 */
-/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_K7 ( 3*32+ 5) "" Athlon */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS ( 3*32+ 5) /* AMD Automatic IBRS */
#define X86_FEATURE_P3 ( 3*32+ 6) /* "" P3 */
#define X86_FEATURE_P4 ( 3*32+ 7) /* "" P4 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC ( 3*32+ 8) /* TSC ticks at a constant rate */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index a3eb4d3e70b8..56e4f3aab31c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define _EFER_SVME 12 /* Enable virtualization */
#define _EFER_LMSLE 13 /* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */
#define _EFER_FFXSR 14 /* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */
+#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS 21 /* Enable Automatic IBRS */

#define EFER_SCE (1<<_EFER_SCE)
#define EFER_LME (1<<_EFER_LME)
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@
#define EFER_SVME (1<<_EFER_SVME)
#define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE)
#define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
+#define EFER_AUTOIBRS (1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS)

/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 66d7addf1784..4060ca8c2c60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
- [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
@@ -1247,6 +1247,7 @@ static const struct {
{ "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
{ "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
{ "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
+ { "autoibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
{ "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
{ "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
@@ -1300,7 +1301,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
- pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@@ -1486,8 +1487,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);

if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
- x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+ } else {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ }
}

switch (mode) {
@@ -1571,8 +1576,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
* and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
- * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
- * enabled.
+ * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't
+ * otherwise enabled.
*
* Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
* the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 423a760fa9de..287b356ccf92 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1340,6 +1340,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);

+ /* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel flag. */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index f53944fb8f7f..cef8c3e688b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS, CPUID_EAX, 20, 0x80000021, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 },
+
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};

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