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SubjectRe: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
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Am Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

>
> > This looks all good to me, but as !->fips_allowed tests aren't skipped
> > over anymore now, it would perhaps make sense to make their failure
> > non-fatal in FIPS mode. Because in FIPS mode a failure could mean a
> > panic and some of the existing TVs might not pass because of e.g. some
> > key length checks or so active only for fips_enabled...
>
> You mean a buggy non-FIPS algorithm that fails when tested in
> FIPS mode? I guess we could skip the panic in that case if
> everyone is happy with that. Stephan?

As we consider FIPS 140-3, we can allow a "degrated mode of operation". A
degraded mode of operation disables only the algorithm that caused the
failure. With a failing self test and not having a panic(), the offending
algorithm implementation will not be available to the kernel crypto API and
thus to a user.

In this case, we can replace the panic with a graceful error.

If that change is applied, I would like to mention to anybody that wants to
backport the change: this change is not appropriate for FIPS 140-2.

Ciao
Stephan


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