Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest | From | "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan" <> | Date | Thu, 30 Sep 2021 12:16:55 -0700 |
| |
+Elena
On 9/30/21 12:04 PM, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote: > > > On 9/30/21 8:23 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: >> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 08:18:18AM -0700, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 9/30/21 6:36 AM, Dan Williams wrote: >>>>> And in particular, not all virtio drivers are hardened - >>>>> I think at this point blk and scsi drivers have been hardened - so >>>>> treating them all the same looks wrong. >>>> My understanding was that they have been audited, Sathya? >>> >>> Yes, AFAIK, it has been audited. Andi also submitted some patches >>> related to it. Andi, can you confirm. >> >> What is the official definition of "audited"? > > > In our case (Confidential Computing platform), the host is an un-trusted > entity. So any interaction with host from the drivers will have to be > protected against the possible attack from the host. For example, if we > are accessing a memory based on index value received from host, we have > to make sure it does not lead to out of bound access or when sharing the > memory with the host, we need to make sure only the required region is > shared with the host and the memory is un-shared after use properly. > > Elena can share more details, but it was achieved with static analysis > and fuzzing. Here is a presentation she is sharing about the work at the > Linux Security Summit: > https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/lssna2021/b6/LSS-HardeningLinuxGuestForCCC.pdf > > Andi, can talk more about the specific driver changes that came out of this > effort. > > In our case the driver is considered "hardened" / "audited" if it can handle > the above scenarios. > >> >> thanks, >> >> greg k-h >> >
-- Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer
| |