Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 3 Aug 2021 16:07:02 +0200 | From | Christian Brauner <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds |
| |
On Tue, Aug 03, 2021 at 03:03:54AM -0700, CGEL wrote: > On Fri, Jul 30, 2021 at 01:23:31AM -0700, CGEL wrote: > > On Wed, Jul 28, 2021 at 01:59:30PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote: > > > [Ccing a few people that did the PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED changes] > > > > > > > > > Hey Cgel, > > > Hey Ran, > > > > > > The gist seems to me that this code wants to make sure that a program > > > can't successfully exec if it has gone through a set*id() transition > > > while exceeding its RLIMIT_NPROC. > > > > > > But I agree that the semantics here are a bit strange. > > > > > > Iicu, a capable but non-INIT_USER caller getting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED set > > > during a set*id() transition wouldn't be able to exec right away if they > > > still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC at the time of exec. So their exec would > > > fail in fs/exec.c: > > > > > > if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) && > > > is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { > > > retval = -EAGAIN; > > > goto out_ret; > > > } > > > > > > However, if the caller were to fork() right after the set*id() > > > transition but before the exec while still exceeding their RLIMIT_NPROC > > > then they would get PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED cleared (while the child would > > > inherit it): > > > > > > retval = -EAGAIN; > > > if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { > > > if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER && > > > !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > > > goto bad_fork_free; > > > } > > > current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; > > > > > > which means a subsequent exec by the capable caller would now succeed > > > even though they could still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC limit. > > > > > > So at first glance, it seems that set_user() should probably get the > > > same check as it can be circumvented today unless I misunderstand the > > > original motivation. > > > > > > Christian > > > > Hi Christian, > > > > I think i didn't give enough information in the commit message. > > When switch to a capable but non-INIT_SUER and the RLIMIT_NPROC limit already exceeded, > > and calls these funcs: > > 1. set_xxuid()->exec() > > ---> fail > > 2. set_xxuid()->fork()->exec() > > ---> success > > Kernel should have the same behavior to uer space. > > Also i think non init_user CAN exceed the limit when with proper capability, > > so in the patch, set_user() clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag if capable() > > returns true. > > Hi, Christian > > Do you have any further comments on this patch? > is there anything i did not give enough infomation ?
Yeah, this is fine and how I understood it too. I don't see anything obviously wrong with it and the weird detour workaround via fork() seems inconsistent. So if I don't here anyone come up with a good reason the current behavior makes sense I'll pick this up.
Christian
| |