Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] xen: harden blkfront against malicious backends | From | Juergen Gross <> | Date | Thu, 8 Jul 2021 16:39:58 +0200 |
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On 08.07.21 16:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: > On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 02:43:42PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote: >> Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0 >> user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might >> reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so >> a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still >> mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by >> other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest). >> >> Unfortunately blkfront in the Linux kernel is fully trusting its >> backend. This series is fixing blkfront in this regard. >> >> It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic >> was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret. > > Wow. This looks like what Marek did .. in 2018! > > https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-04/msg02336.html
Yes, seems to have been a similar goal.
> Would it be worth crediting Marek?
I'm fine mentioning his patches, but I didn't know of his patches until having sent out V1 of my series.
I'd be interested in learning why his patches haven't been taken back then.
Juergen [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-keys][unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature] | |