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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/3 V3] KVM, SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration
On Mon, Jul 26, 2021, Peter Gonda wrote:
> To avoid exposing this internal state to userspace and prevent other
> processes from importing state they shouldn't have access to, the send
> returns a token to userspace that is handed off to the target VM. The
> target passes in this token to receive the sent state. The token is only
> valid for one-time use. Functionality on the source becomes limited
> after send has been performed. If the source is destroyed before the
> target has received, the token becomes invalid.

...

> +11. KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_RECEIVE
> +-------------------------------------
> +
> +The KVM_SEV_INTRA_HOST_RECEIVE command is used to transfer staged SEV
> +info to a target VM from some source VM. SEV on the target VM should be active
> +when receive is performed, but not yet launched and without any pinned memory.
> +The launch commands should be skipped after receive because they should have
> +already been performed on the source.
> +
> +Parameters (in/out): struct kvm_sev_intra_host_receive
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
> +::
> +
> + struct kvm_sev_intra_host_receive {
> + __u64 info_token; /* token referencing the staged info */

Sorry to belatedly throw a wrench in things, but why use a token approach? This
is only intended for migrating between two userspace VMMs using the same KVM
module, which can access both the source and target KVM instances (VMs/guests).
Rather than indirectly communicate through a token, why not communidate directly?
Same idea as svm_vm_copy_asid_from().

The locking needs special consideration, e.g. attempting to take kvm->lock on
both the source and dest could deadlock if userspace is malicious and
double-migrates, but I think a flag and global spinlock to state that migration
is in-progress would suffice.

Locking aside, this would reduce the ABI to a single ioctl(), should avoid most
if not all temporary memory allocations, and would obviate the need for patch 1
since there's no limbo state, i.e. the encrypted regions are either owned by the
source or the dest.

I think the following would work? Another thought would be to make the helpers
and "lock for multi-lock" flag arch-agnostic, e.g. the logic below works iff
this is the only path that takes two kvm->locks simultaneous.

static int svm_sev_lock_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
int ret = 0;

/*
* Bail if this VM is already involved in a migration to avoid deadlock
* between two VMs trying to migrate to/from each other.
*/
spin_lock(&sev_migration_lock);
if (sev->migration_in_progress)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
sev->migration_in_progress = true;
spin_unlock(&sev_migration_lock);

if (!ret)
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);

return ret;
}

static void svm_unlock_after_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
{
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
WRITE_ONCE(sev->migration_in_progress, false);
}

int svm_sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
{
struct file *source_kvm_file;
struct kvm *source_kvm;
int ret = -EINVAL;

ret = svm_sev_lock_for_migration(kvm);
if (ret)
return ret;

if (!sev_guest(kvm))
goto out_unlock;

source_kvm_file = fget(source_fd);
if (!file_is_kvm(source_kvm_file)) {
ret = -EBADF;
goto out_fput;
}

source_kvm = source_kvm_file->private_data;
ret = svm_sev_lock_for_migration(source_kvm);
if (ret)
goto out_fput;

if (!sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_source;
}

<migration magic>

out_source:
svm_unlock_after_migration(&source_kvm->lock);
out_fpu:
if (source_kvm_file)
fput(source_kvm_file);
out_unlock:
svm_unlock_after_migration(kvm);
return ret;
}

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