| From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <> | Subject | [PATCH 5.13 062/266] drm/amd/display: Avoid HDCP over-read and corruption | Date | Thu, 15 Jul 2021 20:36:57 +0200 |
| |
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[ Upstream commit 06888d571b513cbfc0b41949948def6cb81021b2 ]
Instead of reading the desired 5 bytes of the actual target field, the code was reading 8. This could result in a corrupted value if the trailing 3 bytes were non-zero, so instead use an appropriately sized and zero-initialized bounce buffer, and read only 5 bytes before casting to u64.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c index 2cbd931363bd..6d26d9c63ab2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp1_execution.c @@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ static inline enum mod_hdcp_status validate_bksv(struct mod_hdcp *hdcp) { uint64_t n = 0; uint8_t count = 0; + u8 bksv[sizeof(n)] = { }; - memcpy(&n, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv, sizeof(uint64_t)); + memcpy(bksv, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv, sizeof(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv)); + n = *(uint64_t *)bksv; while (n) { count++; -- 2.30.2
|