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SubjectRe: [RFC] /dev/ioasid uAPI proposal
Date
On 08/06/21 15:15, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 08, 2021 at 09:56:09AM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>
>>>> Alternatively you can add a KVM_DEV_IOASID_{ADD,DEL} pair of ioctls. But it
>>>> seems useless complication compared to just using what we have now, at least
>>>> while VMs only use IOASIDs via VFIO.
>>>
>>> The simplest is KVM_ENABLE_WBINVD(<fd security proof>) and be done
>>> with it.
>>
>> The simplest one is KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_ADD/DEL, that already exists and also
>> covers hot-unplug. The second simplest one is KVM_DEV_IOASID_ADD/DEL.
>
> This isn't the same thing, this is back to trying to have the kernel
> set policy for userspace.

If you want a userspace policy then there would be three states:

* WBINVD enabled because a WBINVD-enabled VFIO device is attached.

* WBINVD potentially enabled but no WBINVD-enabled VFIO device attached

* WBINVD forcefully disabled

KVM_DEV_VFIO_GROUP_ADD/DEL can still be used to distinguish the first
two. Due to backwards compatibility, those two describe the default
behavior; disabling wbinvd can be done easily with a new sub-ioctl of
KVM_ENABLE_CAP and doesn't require any security proof.

The meaning of WBINVD-enabled is "won't return -ENXIO for the wbinvd
ioctl", nothing more nothing less. If all VFIO devices are going to be
WBINVD-enabled, then that will reflect on KVM as well, and I won't have
anything to object if there's consensus on the device assignment side of
things that the wbinvd ioctl won't ever fail.

Paolo

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