lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2021]   [Jun]   [17]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
From
Date
SubjectRe: [PATCH v3] lockdown,selinux: fix wrong subject in some SELinux lockdown checks
On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 4:51 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Commit 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux
> lockdown") added an implementation of the locked_down LSM hook to
> SELinux, with the aim to restrict which domains are allowed to perform
> operations that would breach lockdown.
>
> However, in several places the security_locked_down() hook is called in
> situations where the current task isn't doing any action that would
> directly breach lockdown, leading to SELinux checks that are basically
> bogus.
>
> To fix this, add an explicit struct cred pointer argument to
> security_lockdown() and define NULL as a special value to pass instead
> of current_cred() in such situations. LSMs that take the subject
> credentials into account can then fall back to some default or ignore
> such calls altogether. In the SELinux lockdown hook implementation, use
> SECINITSID_KERNEL in case the cred argument is NULL.
>
> Most of the callers are updated to pass current_cred() as the cred
> pointer, thus maintaining the same behavior. The following callers are
> modified to pass NULL as the cred pointer instead:
> 1. arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
> Seems to be some interactive debugging facility. It appears that
> the lockdown hook is called from interrupt context here, so it
> should be more appropriate to request a global lockdown decision.
> 2. fs/tracefs/inode.c:tracefs_create_file()
> Here the call is used to prevent creating new tracefs entries when
> the kernel is locked down. Assumes that locking down is one-way -
> i.e. if the hook returns non-zero once, it will never return zero
> again, thus no point in creating these files. Also, the hook is
> often called by a module's init function when it is loaded by
> userspace, where it doesn't make much sense to do a check against
> the current task's creds, since the task itself doesn't actually
> use the tracing functionality (i.e. doesn't breach lockdown), just
> indirectly makes some new tracepoints available to whoever is
> authorized to use them.
> 3. net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:copy_to_user_*()
> Here a cryptographic secret is redacted based on the value returned
> from the hook. There are two possible actions that may lead here:
> a) A netlink message XFRM_MSG_GETSA with NLM_F_DUMP set - here the
> task context is relevant, since the dumped data is sent back to
> the current task.
> b) When adding/deleting/updating an SA via XFRM_MSG_xxxSA, the
> dumped SA is broadcasted to tasks subscribed to XFRM events -
> here the current task context is not relevant as it doesn't
> represent the tasks that could potentially see the secret.
> It doesn't seem worth it to try to keep using the current task's
> context in the a) case, since the eventual data leak can be
> circumvented anyway via b), plus there is no way for the task to
> indicate that it doesn't care about the actual key value, so the
> check could generate a lot of "false alert" denials with SELinux.
> Thus, let's pass NULL instead of current_cred() here faute de
> mieux.
>
> Improvements-suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Improvements-suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Fixes: 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>

This seems reasonable to me, but before I merge it into the SELinux
tree I think it would be good to get some ACKs from the relevant
subsystem folks. I don't believe we ever saw a response to the last
question for the PPC folks, did we?

> ---
>
> v3:
> - add the cred argument to security_locked_down() and adapt all callers
> - keep using current_cred() in BPF, as the hook calls have been shifted
> to program load time (commit ff40e51043af ("bpf, lockdown, audit: Fix
> buggy SELinux lockdown permission checks"))
> - in SELinux, don't ignore hook calls where cred == NULL, but use
> SECINITSID_KERNEL as the subject instead
> - update explanations in the commit message
>
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210517092006.803332-1-omosnace@redhat.com/
> - change to a single hook based on suggestions by Casey Schaufler
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210507114048.138933-1-omosnace@redhat.com/
>
> arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 2 +-
> drivers/acpi/acpi_configfs.c | 2 +-
> drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 2 +-
> drivers/acpi/osl.c | 3 ++-
> drivers/acpi/tables.c | 2 +-
> drivers/char/mem.c | 2 +-
> drivers/cxl/mem.c | 2 +-
> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +-
> drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c | 2 +-
> drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 6 +++---
> drivers/pci/proc.c | 6 +++---
> drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +-
> drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 2 +-
> drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 2 +-
> fs/debugfs/file.c | 2 +-
> fs/debugfs/inode.c | 2 +-
> fs/proc/kcore.c | 2 +-
> fs/tracefs/inode.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 +
> include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
> kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 10 ++++++----
> kernel/events/core.c | 2 +-
> kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 2 +-
> kernel/module.c | 2 +-
> kernel/params.c | 2 +-
> kernel/power/hibernate.c | 3 ++-
> kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
> kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++-----
> kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 4 ++--
> kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_kprobe.c | 6 +++---
> kernel/trace/trace_printk.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_stack.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_stat.c | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_uprobe.c | 4 ++--
> net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 11 +++++++++--
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 3 ++-
> security/security.c | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++--
> 48 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2021-06-18 05:41    [W:0.143 / U:0.200 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site