Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in __lock_sock (high-risk primitives found) | From | SyzScope <> | Date | Wed, 5 May 2021 14:21:57 -0700 |
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Hi,
This is SyzScope, a research project that aims to reveal high-risk primitives from a seemingly low-risk bug (UAF/OOB read, WARNING, BUG, etc.).
We are currently testing seemingly low-risk bugs on syzbot's open section(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/upstream), and try to reach out to kernel developers if SyzScope discovers any high-risk primitives.
Regrading the bug "KASAN: use-after-free Read in __lock_sock", it seems that this bug is still missing a valid patch.
SyzScope reports 8 memory write primitives, and 1 control flow hijacking primitives from this bug.
The detailed comments can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/syzscope/kasan-use-after-free-read-in-lock_sock
Please let us know if SyzScope indeed helps, and any suggestions/feedback.
On 11/22/2018 6:37 AM, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner wrote: > On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 10:44:16PM +0900, Xin Long wrote: >> On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 10:13 PM Marcelo Ricardo Leitner >> <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> wrote: >>> On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 05:57:33PM +0900, Xin Long wrote: >>>> On Sat, Nov 17, 2018 at 4:18 PM syzbot >>>> <syzbot+9276d76e83e3bcde6c99@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote: >>>>> Hello, >>>>> >>>>> syzbot found the following crash on: >>>>> >>>>> HEAD commit: ccda4af0f4b9 Linux 4.20-rc2 >>>>> git tree: upstream >>>>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=156cd533400000 >>>>> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=4a0a89f12ca9b0f5 >>>>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9276d76e83e3bcde6c99 >>>>> compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental) >>>>> >>>>> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet. >>>>> >>>>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit: >>>>> Reported-by: syzbot+9276d76e83e3bcde6c99@syzkaller.appspotmail.com >>>>> >>>>> netlink: 5 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process >>>>> `syz-executor5'. >>>>> ================================================================== >>>>> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 >>>>> kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 >>>>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881d26d60e0 by task syz-executor1/13725 >>>>> >>>>> CPU: 0 PID: 13725 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc2+ #333 >>>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS >>>>> Google 01/01/2011 >>>>> Call Trace: >>>>> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] >>>>> dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113 >>>>> print_address_description.cold.7+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 >>>>> kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] >>>>> kasan_report.cold.8+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 >>>>> __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 >>>>> __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 >>>>> lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3844 >>>>> __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:135 [inline] >>>>> _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:168 >>>>> spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:334 [inline] >>>>> __lock_sock+0x203/0x350 net/core/sock.c:2253 >>>>> lock_sock_nested+0xfe/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2774 >>>>> lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1492 [inline] >>>>> sctp_sock_dump+0x122/0xb20 net/sctp/diag.c:324 >>>> static int sctp_sock_dump(struct sctp_transport *tsp, void *p) >>>> { >>>> struct sctp_endpoint *ep = tsp->asoc->ep; >>>> struct sctp_comm_param *commp = p; >>>> struct sock *sk = ep->base.sk; <--- [1] >>>> ... >>>> int err = 0; >>>> >>>> lock_sock(sk); <--- [2] >>>> >>>> Between [1] and [2], an asoc peeloff may happen, still thinking >>>> how to avoid this. >>> This race cannot happen more than once for an asoc, so something >>> like this may be doable: >>> >>> struct sctp_comm_param *commp = p; >>> struct sctp_endpoint *ep; >>> struct sock *sk; >>> ... >>> int err = 0; >>> >>> again: >>> ep = tsp->asoc->ep; >>> sk = ep->base.sk; <---[3] >>> lock_sock(sk); <--- [2] >> if peel-off happens between [3] and [2], and sk is freed >> somewhere, it will panic on [2] when trying to get the >> sk->lock, no? > Not sure what protects it, but this construct is also used in BH processing at > sctp_rcv(): > ... > bh_lock_sock(sk); [4] > > if (sk != rcvr->sk) { > /* Our cached sk is different from the rcvr->sk. This is > * because migrate()/accept() may have moved the association > * to a new socket and released all the sockets. So now we > * are holding a lock on the old socket while the user may > * be doing something with the new socket. Switch our veiw > * of the current sk. > */ > bh_unlock_sock(sk); > sk = rcvr->sk; > bh_lock_sock(sk); > } > ... > > If it is not safe, then we have an issue there too. > And by [4] that copy on sk is pretty old already. > >>> if (sk != tsp->asoc->ep->base.sk) { >>> /* Asoc was peeloff'd */ >>> unlock_sock(sk); >>> goto again; >>> } >>> >>> Similarly to what we did on cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk >>> after waking up from wait_buf sleep").
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