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    Subject[PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends
    Date
    Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
    user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
    reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
    a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
    mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
    other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).

    Unfortunately many frontends in the Linux kernel are fully trusting
    their respective backends. This series is starting to fix the most
    important frontends: console, disk and network.

    It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
    was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.

    Juergen Gross (8):
    xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version
    xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once
    xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page
    xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
    xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
    xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
    xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
    xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value

    drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 118 +++++++++-----
    drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 184 ++++++++++++++-------
    drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 15 +-
    include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 278 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
    4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)

    --
    2.26.2

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