Messages in this thread | | | From | Thomas Gleixner <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support | Date | Wed, 31 Mar 2021 09:50:20 +0200 |
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On Tue, Mar 30 2021 at 13:57, Kees Cook wrote:
> Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly > 5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the > method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry > code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall, > which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point). > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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