lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2021]   [Mar]   [19]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v30 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 09:42:44PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead
> to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker
> to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing
> malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of
> the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee.
>
> A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process
> and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating
> processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a
> target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target
> process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer).
>
> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

--
Kees Cook

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2021-03-19 19:46    [W:0.270 / U:2.360 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site