Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 14 Feb 2021 11:33:20 -0800 | From | Andi Kleen <> | Subject | Re: [RFC v1 05/26] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest |
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On Fri, Feb 12, 2021 at 01:48:36PM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 2/12/21 1:47 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> What about adding a property to the TD, e.g. via a flag set during TD creation, > >> that controls whether unaccepted accesses cause #VE or are, for all intents and > >> purposes, fatal? That would allow Linux to pursue treating EPT #VEs for private > >> GPAs as fatal, but would give us a safety and not prevent others from utilizing > >> #VEs. > > That seems reasonable. > > Ditto. > > We first need to double check to see if the docs are right, though.
I confirmed with the TDX module owners that #VE can only happen for: - unaccepted pages - instructions like MSR access or CPUID - specific instructions that are no in the syscall gap
Also if there are future asynchronous #VEs they would only happen with IF=1, which would also protect the gap.
So no need to make #VE an IST.
-Andi
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