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SubjectRe: [PATCH v4] random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness()
On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 3:59 PM Dominik Brodowski
<linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Jason,
>
> Am Thu, Dec 02, 2021 at 11:55:10AM -0500 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> > Thanks for the patch. One trivial nit and one question:
>
> Thanks for your review!
>
> > On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 6:35 AM Dominik Brodowski
> > <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
> > > + /* We cannot do much with the input pool until it is set up in
> > > + * rand_initalize(); therefore just mix into the crng state.
> >
> > I think you meant "rand_initialize()" here (missing 'i').
>
> Indeed, sorry about that.
>
> > > If the added entropy suffices to increase crng_init to 1, future calls
> > > to add_bootloader_randomness() or add_hwgenerator_randomness() used to
> > > progress to credit_entropy_bits(). However, if the input pool is not yet
> > > properly set up, the cmpxchg call within that function can lead to an
> > > infinite recursion.
> >
> > I see what this patch does with crng_global_init_time, and that seems
> > probably sensible, but I didn't understand this part of the reasoning
> > in the commit message; I might just be a bit slow here. Where's the
> > recursion exactly? Or even an infinite loop?
>
> On arm64, it was actually a NULL pointer dereference reported by Ivan T.
> Ivanov; see
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211012082708.121931-1-iivanov@suse.de/
>
> Trying to reproduce this rather bluntly on x86/qemu by multiple manual calls
> to add_bootloader_randomness(), I mis-interpreted the symptoms to point to an
> infinite recursion. The real problem seems to be that crng_reseed() isn't
> ready to be called too early in the boot process, in particular before
> workqueues are ready (see the call to numa_crng_init()).
>
> However, there seem be additional issues with add_bootloader_randomness()
> not yet addressed (or worsened) by my patch:
>
> - If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled and crng_init==0,
> add_hwgenerator_randomness() calls crng_fast_load() and returns
> immediately. If it is disabled and crng_init==0,
> add_device_randnomness() calls crng_slow_load() but still
> continues to call _mix_pool_bytes(). That means the seed is
> used more extensively if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not
> set!
If called by the crng_slow_load(), it's mixed into the pool but we're
not trusting it. But in crng_fast_load() we're using it to init crng.

>
> - If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled and crng_init==0,
> the entropy is not credited -- same as if
> CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set. Only subsequent calls

In crng_fast_load(), the seed would be mixed to primary_crng.state[4],
and then crng_init will be 1 if the added seed is enough.
rng-seed in dt (called in early_init_dt_scan_chosen()) also needs to
use this function to init crng.

With the patch, we're seeing
[ 0.000000] random: get_random_u64 called from
__kmem_cache_create+0x34/0x270 with crng_init=0

While before it should be
[ 0.000000] random: get_random_u64 called from
__kmem_cache_create+0x34/0x280 with crng_init=1

> to add_bootloader_randomness() would credit entropy, but that
> causes the issue NULL pointer dereference or the hang...
>
> - As crng_fast_load() returns early, that actually means that my
> patch causes the additional entropy submitted to
> add_hwgenerator_randomness() by subsequent calls to be completely
> lost.
Only when crng_init==0, if crng is initialized, it would continue with
credit_entropy_bits().

>
> - For add_bootloader_randomness(), it makes no sense at all to call
> wait_event_interruptible().
>
> Therefore, it might make more sense to
>
> - modify add_bootloader_randomness() to always call
> add_device_randomness(), and if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is
> enabled, to call credit_entropy_bits().
>
> - update credit_entropy_bits() to not call credit_entropy_bits()
> if crng_global_init_time==0, as workqueues (and possibly other
> infrastructure) might not be available at that time.
>
> What do you think? Draft patch below. @Ivan: Could you re-test on your
> system, please?
>
> Thanks,
> Dominik
>
> ---
>
> Currently, if CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is enabled, mutliple calls
> to add_bootloader_randomness() are broken and can cause a NULL pointer
> dereference, as noted by Ivan T. Ivanov. This is not only a hypothetical
> problem, as qemu on arm64 may provide bootloader entropy via EFI and via
> devicetree.
>
> On the first call to add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() is
> executed, and if the seed is long enough, crng_init will be set to 1.
> However, no entropy is currently credited for that, even though the
> name and description of CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER states otherwise.
>
> On subsequent calls to add_bootloader_randomness() and then to
> add_hwgenerator_randomness(), crng_fast_load() will be skipped. Instead,
> wait_event_interruptible() (which makes no sense for the init process)
> and then credit_entropy_bits() will be called. If the entropy count for
> that second seed is large enough, that proceeds to crng_reseed().
> However, crng_reseed() may depend on workqueues being available, which
> is not the case early during boot.
>
> To fix these issues, unconditionally call add_device_randomness() but not
> add_hwgenerator_randomness() in add_bootloader_randomness(). This has the
> additional advantage that the seed provided by the first call to
> add_bootloader_randomness() is not only used by crng_{fast,slow}_load(),
> but also mixed into the input pool. If CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is
> set, explicitly credit the entropy. However, avoid a call to crng_reseed()
> too early during boot. It is safe to be called after rand_initialize(),
> so use crng_global_init_time (which is set to != 0 in that function) to
> determine which branch to take.
>
> Reported-by: Ivan T. Ivanov <iivanov@suse.de>
> Fixes: 18b915ac6b0a ("efi/random: Treat EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL output as bootloader randomness")
> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
>
> ---
> v3->v4: complete rewrite
> v2->v3: only one unlikely (Ard Biesheuvel)
> v1->v2: fix commit message; unmerge Reported-and-tested-by-tag (Ard Biesheuvel)
>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index 605969ed0f96..d8614b426dfb 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -722,7 +722,8 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
> if (r == &input_pool) {
> int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
>
> - if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128)
> + if (crng_init < 2 && entropy_bits >= 128 &&
> + crng_global_init_time > 0)
> crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
> }
> }
> @@ -1763,8 +1764,8 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
> }
>
> /*
> - * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
> - * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
> + * add_device_randomness() or add_bootloader_randomness() may be
> + * called long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
> * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
> * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
> * statically allocated structures that already have all
> @@ -2291,15 +2292,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
>
> /* Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
> - * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
> - * it would be regarded as device data.
> + * If the seed is trustworthy, its entropy will be credited.
> * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
> */
> void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
> {
> + add_device_randomness(buf, size);
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
> - add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
> - else
> - add_device_randomness(buf, size);
> + credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, size * 8);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);

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