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SubjectRe: [PATCH] optee: Suppress false positive kmemleak report in optee_handle_rpc()
On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 03:08:21PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Fri, 10 Dec 2021 at 13:40, Jerome Forissier <jerome@forissier.org> wrote:
> >
> > +CC Jens, Etienne
> >
> > On 12/10/21 06:00, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > On Fri, 10 Dec 2021 at 09:42, Wang, Xiaolei <Xiaolei.Wang@windriver.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
> > >> Sent: Thursday, December 9, 2021 7:41 PM
> > >> To: Wang, Xiaolei <Xiaolei.Wang@windriver.com>
> > >> Cc: jens.wiklander@linaro.org; op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> > >> Subject: Re: [PATCH] optee: Suppress false positive kmemleak report in optee_handle_rpc()
> > >>
> > >> [Please note: This e-mail is from an EXTERNAL e-mail address]
> > >>
> > >> On Mon, 6 Dec 2021 at 17:35, Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang@windriver.com> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> We observed the following kmemleak report:
> > >>> unreferenced object 0xffff000007904500 (size 128):
> > >>> comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294892671 (age 44.036s)
> > >>> hex dump (first 32 bytes):
> > >>> 00 47 90 07 00 00 ff ff 60 00 c0 ff 00 00 00 00 .G......`.......
> > >>> 60 00 80 13 00 80 ff ff a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 `...............
> > >>> backtrace:
> > >>> [<000000004c12b1c7>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1ac/0x2f4
> > >>> [<000000005d23eb4f>] tee_shm_alloc+0x78/0x230
> > >>> [<00000000794dd22c>] optee_handle_rpc+0x60/0x6f0
> > >>> [<00000000d9f7c52d>] optee_do_call_with_arg+0x17c/0x1dc
> > >>> [<00000000c35884da>] optee_open_session+0x128/0x1ec
> > >>> [<000000001748f2ff>] tee_client_open_session+0x28/0x40
> > >>> [<00000000aecb5389>] optee_enumerate_devices+0x84/0x2a0
> > >>> [<000000003df18bf1>] optee_probe+0x674/0x6cc
> > >>> [<000000003a4a534a>] platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xb0
> > >>> [<000000000c51ce7d>] really_probe+0xe4/0x4d0
> > >>> [<000000002f04c865>] driver_probe_device+0x58/0xc0
> > >>> [<00000000b485397d>] device_driver_attach+0xc0/0xd0
> > >>> [<00000000c835f0df>] __driver_attach+0x84/0x124
> > >>> [<000000008e5a429c>] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0
> > >>> [<000000001735e8a8>] driver_attach+0x24/0x30
> > >>> [<000000006d94b04f>] bus_add_driver+0x104/0x1ec
> > >>>
> > >>> This is not a memory leak because we pass the share memory pointer to
> > >>> secure world and would get it from secure world before releasing it.
> > >>
> > >>> How about if it's actually a memory leak caused by the secure world?
> > >>> An example being secure world just allocates kernel memory via OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_ALLOC and doesn't free it via OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FREE.
> > >>
> > >>> IMO, we need to cross-check optee-os if it's responsible for leaking kernel memory.
> > >>
> > >> Hi sumit,
> > >>
> > >> You mean we need to check whether there is a real memleak,
> > >> If being secure world just allocate kernel memory via OPTEE_SMC_PRC_FUNC_ALLOC and until the end, there is no free
> > >> It via OPTEE_SMC_PRC_FUNC_FREE, then we should judge it as a memory leak, wo need to judge whether it is caused by secure os?
> > >
> > > Yes. AFAICT, optee-os should allocate shared memory to communicate
> > > with tee-supplicant. So once the communication is done, the underlying
> > > shared memory should be freed. I can't think of any scenario where
> > > optee-os should keep hold-off shared memory indefinitely.
> >
> > I believe it can happen when OP-TEE's CFG_PREALLOC_RPC_CACHE is y. See
> > the config file [1] and the commit which introduced this config [2].
>
> Okay, I see the reasoning. So during the OP-TEE driver's lifetime, the
> RPC shared memory remains allocated. I guess that is done primarily
> for performance reasons.
>
> But still it doesn't feel appropriate that we term all RPC shm
> allocations as not leaking memory as we might miss obvious ones.

IIUC this patch adds kmemleak_not_leak() at (pretty much) the last
possible point before *ownership* of the SHM block is passed from kernel
to OP-TEE.

Sure, after we change ownership it could still be leaked... but it can
no longer be leaked by the kernel because the kernel no longer owns it!
More importantly, it makes no sense to run the kernel memory detector on the
buffer because it simply can't work.

After the RPC completes, doesn't it become impossible for kmemleak to
scan to see if the pointer is lost[1]? kmemleak is essentially a tracing
garbage collector and needs to be able to scan all memory that could
hold a pointer to leakable memory. After the RPC completes the
only copy of the pointer will be stored in a memory region that the
kernel is prohibited from reading. How could kmemleak possibly give you
a useful answer in this circumstance?

In other words if there's nothing kmemleak could do to fix this
situation then marking the memory as kmemleak_not_leak() seems entirely
appropriate (although it should be prefaced with a big comment
explaining the change of ownerhship and why kmemleak cannot work).


Daniel.


[1] Everything I've said here hinges on this being true... so if I've
made a mistake about where OP-TEE stores this pointer then most of
the rest of this post is junk ;-)

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