Messages in this thread | | | From | Tobias Waldekranz <> | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH] net: phy/mdio: enable mmd indirect access through phy_mii_ioctl() | Date | Thu, 04 Nov 2021 14:06:54 +0100 |
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On Thu, Nov 04, 2021 at 12:35, "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote: > On Thu, Nov 04, 2021 at 12:17:47PM +0100, Tobias Waldekranz wrote: >> On Wed, Nov 03, 2021 at 20:36, Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> wrote: >> > On Wed, Nov 03, 2021 at 08:42:07PM +0200, Grygorii Strashko wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On 03/11/2021 02:27, Andrew Lunn wrote: >> >> > > > What i find interesting is that you and the other resent requester are >> >> > > > using the same user space tool. If you implement C45 over C22 in that >> >> > > > tool, you get your solution, and it will work for older kernels as >> >> > > > well. Also, given the diverse implementations of this IOTCL, it >> >> > > > probably works for more drivers than just those using phy_mii_ioctl(). >> >> > > >> >> > > Do you mean change uapi, like >> >> > > add mdio_phy_id_is_c45_over_c22() and >> >> > > flag #define MDIO_PHY_ID_C45_OVER_C22 0x4000? >> >> > >> >> > No, i mean user space implements C45 over C22. Make phytool write >> >> > MII_MMD_CTRL and MII_MMD_DATA to perform a C45 over C22. >> >> >> >> Now I give up - as mentioned there is now way to sync User space vs Kernel >> >> MMD transactions and so no way to get trusted results. >> >> Except that there is a way: https://github.com/wkz/mdio-tools > > I'm guessing that this hasn't had much in the way of review, as it has > a nice exploitable bug - you really want "pc" to be unsigned in > mdio_nl_eval(), otherwise one can write a branch instruction that makes > "pc" negative.
You are quite right, it never got that far as it was NAKed on principle before that. I welcome the review, this is one of the reasons why I would love to have it in mainline. Alternatively, if someone has a better idea, I wouldn't mind adapting mdio-tools to whatever that interface would be.
I agree that there should be much more rigorous checks around the modification of the PC. I will get on that.
> Also it looks like one can easily exploit this to trigger any of your > BUG_ON()/BUG() statements, thereby crashing while holding the MDIO bus > lock causing a denial of service attack.
The idea is that this is pre-validated in mdio_nl_validate_insn. Each instruction lists their acceptable argument types in mdio_nl_op_protos.
> I also see nothing that protects against any user on a system being > able to use this interface, so the exploits above can be triggered by > any user. Moreover, this lack of protection means any user on the > system can use this interface to write to a PHY.
I was under the impression that specifying GENL_ADMIN_PERM in the `struct genl_ops` would require the caller to hold CAP_NET_ADMIN?
> Given that some PHYs today contain firmware, this gives anyone access > to reprogram the PHY firmware, possibly introducing malicious firmware. > > I hope no one is using this module in a production environment.
Thanks for your review.
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