Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 23 Nov 2021 17:26:14 +0100 | From | Borislav Petkov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support |
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On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 03:36:35PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote: > Kirill posted a few RFCs that did exactly that. It's definitely a viable approach, > but it's a bit of a dead end,
One thing at a time...
> e.g. doesn't help solve page migration,
AFAICR, that needs a whole explicit and concerted effort with the migration helper - that was one of the approaches, at least, guest's explicit involvement, remote attestation and a bunch of other things...
> is limited to struct page
I'm no mm guy so maybe you can elaborate further.
> doesn't capture which KVM guest owns the memory, etc...
So I don't think we need this for the problem at hand. But from the sound of it, it probably is a good idea to be able to map the guest owner to the memory anyway.
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/
Right, there it is in the last patch.
Hmmkay, so we need some generic machinery which unmaps memory from the host kernel's pagetables so that it doesn't do any stray/unwanted accesses to it. I'd look in the direction of mm folks for what to do exactly, though.
Thx.
-- Regards/Gruss, Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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