Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support | From | Dave Hansen <> | Date | Fri, 12 Nov 2021 13:37:45 -0800 |
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On 11/12/21 1:30 PM, Marc Orr wrote: > In this proposal, consider a guest driver instructing a device to DMA > write a 1 GB memory buffer. A well-behaved guest driver will ensure > that the entire 1 GB is marked shared. But what about a malicious or > buggy guest? Let's assume a bad guest driver instructs the device to > write guest private memory. > > So now, the virtual device, which might be implemented as some host > side process, needs to (1) check and lock all 4k constituent RMP > entries (so they're not converted to private while the DMA write is > taking palce), (2) write the 1 GB buffer, and (3) unlock all 4 k > constituent RMP entries? If I'm understanding this correctly, then the > synchronization will be prohibitively expensive.
Are you taking about a 1GB *mapping* here? As in, something us using a 1GB page table entry to map the 1GB memory buffer? That was the only case where I knew we needed coordination between neighbor RMP entries and host memory accesses.
That 1GB problem _should_ be impossible. I thought we settled on disabling hugetlbfs and fracturing the whole of the direct map down to 4k.
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