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SubjectRe: [PATCH] signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed
Andrea Righi <> writes:

> On Fri, Oct 29, 2021 at 10:09:04AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> As Andy pointed out that there are races between
>> force_sig_info_to_task and sigaction[1] when force_sig_info_task. As
>> Kees discovered[2] ptrace is also able to change these signals.
>> In the case of seeccomp killing a process with a signal it is a
>> security violation to allow the signal to be caught or manipulated.
>> Solve this problem by introducing a new flag SA_IMMUTABLE that
>> prevents sigaction and ptrace from modifying these forced signals.
>> This flag is carefully made kernel internal so that no new ABI is
>> introduced.
>> Longer term I think this can be solved by guaranteeing short circuit
>> delivery of signals in this case. Unfortunately reliable and
>> guaranteed short circuit delivery of these signals is still a ways off
>> from being implemented, tested, and merged. So I have implemented a much
>> simpler alternative for now.
>> [1]
>> [2]
>> Cc:
>> Fixes: 307d522f5eb8 ("signal/seccomp: Refactor seccomp signal and coredump generation")
>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <>
>> ---
> FWIW I've tested this patch and I confirm that it fixes the failure that
> I reported with the seccomp_bpf selftest.
> Tested-by: Andrea Righi <>

Sigh. Except for the extra 0 in the definition of SA_IMMUTABLE
that caused it to conflict with the x86 specific signal numbers.


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