Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled | From | Andrew Cooper <> | Date | Mon, 25 Jan 2021 17:26:39 +0000 |
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On 25/01/2021 14:00, Juergen Gross wrote: > diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c > index 4409306364dc..82948251f57b 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c > +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c > @@ -583,6 +583,14 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug) > exc_debug(regs); > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT > +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_vmm_communication) > +{ > + /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */ > + panic("X86_TRAP_VC in Xen PV mode.");
Honestly, exactly the same is true of #VE, #HV and #SX.
What we do in the hypervisor is wire up one handler for all unknown exceptions (to avoid potential future #DF issues) leading to a panic. Wouldn't it be better to do this unconditionally, especially as #GP/#NP doesn't work for PV guests for unregistered callbacks, rather than fixing up piecewise like this?
~Andrew
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