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SubjectRe: [PATCH v17 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection
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On 1/19/2021 3:06 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2020 at 01:30:29PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
>> corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
>> CONFIG_X86_CET_USER enabled, and the application is built for the feature.
>> This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy
>> non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
>> 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> index 7b6dd10b162a..72cff400b9ae 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> @@ -1950,6 +1950,28 @@ config X86_SGX
>>
>> If unsure, say N.
>>
>> +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>> + def_bool n
>> +
>> +config X86_CET_USER
>
> That thing needs to be X86_CET. How many times do I need to type this
> before you do it?
>

Yes, I totally understand that now. I was still thinking about
separately enabling user/kernel mode. Perhaps I should have
communicated that thought before the change. Sorry about that. I will
update it.

--
Yu-cheng

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