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Subject[PATCH v2 04/12] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded
Date
evm_inode_init_security() requires the HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. Unfortunately, with the evm_key_loaded()
check, the function continues even if the HMAC key is not loaded
(evm_key_loaded() returns true also if EVM has been initialized only with a
public key). If the HMAC key is not loaded, evm_inode_init_security()
returns an error later when it calls evm_init_hmac().

Thus, this patch replaces the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the
EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized, so that evm_inode_init_security()
returns 0 instead of an error.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index e4b47759ba1c..4e9f5e8b21d5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -527,7 +527,8 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
int rc;

- if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+ if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
+ !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
return 0;

xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
--
2.27.GIT
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