Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH RESEND] docs: update trusted-encrypted.rst | From | James Bottomley <> | Date | Tue, 18 Aug 2020 09:19:18 -0700 |
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On Tue, 2020-08-18 at 18:44 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Sun, Aug 16, 2020 at 10:12:13AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > > On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 00:57 +0800, Coly Li wrote: > > > On 2020/8/17 00:36, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > On Sun, 2020-08-16 at 12:06 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > > > > [...] > > > > > A note in this file states this: > > > > > > > > > > Note: When using a TPM 2.0 with a persistent key with handle > > > > > 0x81000001, append 'keyhandle=0x81000001' to statements > > > > > between quotes, such as "new 32 keyhandle=0x81000001". > > > > > > > > > > Now if someone was (still) interested in TPM 1.2 > > > > > adapt the note to state that these keyhandle=... should be > > > > > removed for the TPM 1.2 case. > > > > > > > > Actually, I also have a plan to match what userspace does and > > > > simply assume a keyhandle of 40000001 (generate an EC Storage > > > > Primary Key on the fly) if it's not specified, which will make > > > > the TPM1.2 and 2.0 versions of this the same. Unfortunately > > > > the necessary precursor patches are taking an age to get > > > > upstream. > > > > > > Hi James, > > > > > > Do you have a plan to push such patches into upstream soon? If > > > yes than I may wait for your patch and withdraw this one. > > > > Well, as I said above it depends on not yet upstream precursor > > patches. They have been pending for about a year, so I've no real > > idea of the timeline. > > > > James > > As far as I remember there was not much left in the previous version > to do. Some time has passed when it was discussed but I recall it was > mainly about documenting the key format.
Actually, no, unfortunately it's not in that update. Generating an on- the-fly primary would involve the cryptographic security patch (same mechanism as used to generate the null primary). I was thinking I'd extract just that piece and use it in a follow on. So both the rework of the key format and this extra patch that's not yet even broken out of the TPM security series are required precursors.
James
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