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Subject[PATCH RFC 3/7] x86: kernel: cpu: bugs.c: modify static_cpu_has to boot_cpu_has
Date
The usage of static_cpu_has in bugs.c file is counter-productive
since the code is executed once but there is extra effort to patch
it and keep alternatives in a special section --- so there is both
space and time cost.

Quote from _static_cpu_has definition:
/*
* Static testing of CPU features. Used the same as boot_cpu_has(). It
* statically patches the target code for additional performance. Use
* static_cpu_has() only in fast paths, where every cycle counts. Which
* means that the boot_cpu_has() variant is already fast enough for the
* majority of cases and you should stick to using it as it is generally
* only two instructions: a RIP-relative MOV and a TEST.
*/

There are two other places where static_cpu_has is used and might be
considered critical paths: __speculation_ctrl_update() and vmx_l1d_flush().

Given these facts, changing static_cpu_has to boot_cpu_has is done in
order to bypass alternative instructions which cannot be updated at runtime
for now.

Signed-off-by: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 +++++++++---------
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1760598..21b9df3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -168,8 +168,8 @@ void __ref check_bugs(void)
guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;

/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);

/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
@@ -186,8 +186,8 @@ void __ref check_bugs(void)
* If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
* MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
*/
- if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
- !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
return;

/*
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void __ref check_bugs(void)
* virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
* current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
*/
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
else
hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
@@ -1164,8 +1164,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
* bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
* case where the host does not enable it.
*/
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
}

@@ -1181,8 +1181,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
* Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
* use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
*/
- if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
- !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
x86_amd_ssb_disable();
} else {
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index f362ce0..6362e0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -546,14 +546,14 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();

/* Handle change of TIF_SSBD depending on the mitigation method. */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) {
if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD)
amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
- } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) {
if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD)
amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
- } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD);
msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index cb22f33..f08ef38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6145,7 +6145,7 @@ static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;

- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
return;
}
--
1.8.3.1
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