Messages in this thread |  | | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH 14/16] irq: Add support for core-wide protection of IRQ and softirq | From | "Li, Aubrey" <> | Date | Fri, 10 Jul 2020 20:19:24 +0800 |
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Hi Joel/Vineeth,
On 2020/7/1 5:32, Vineeth Remanan Pillai wrote: > From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org> > > With current core scheduling patchset, non-threaded IRQ and softirq > victims can leak data from its hyperthread to a sibling hyperthread > running an attacker. > > For MDS, it is possible for the IRQ and softirq handlers to leak data to > either host or guest attackers. For L1TF, it is possible to leak to > guest attackers. There is no possible mitigation involving flushing of > buffers to avoid this since the execution of attacker and victims happen > concurrently on 2 or more HTs. > > The solution in this patch is to monitor the outer-most core-wide > irq_enter() and irq_exit() executed by any sibling. In between these > two, we mark the core to be in a special core-wide IRQ state. > > In the IRQ entry, if we detect that the sibling is running untrusted > code, we send a reschedule IPI so that the sibling transitions through > the sibling's irq_exit() to do any waiting there, till the IRQ being > protected finishes. > > We also monitor the per-CPU outer-most irq_exit(). If during the per-cpu > outer-most irq_exit(), the core is still in the special core-wide IRQ > state, we perform a busy-wait till the core exits this state. This > combination of per-cpu and core-wide IRQ states helps to handle any > combination of irq_entry()s and irq_exit()s happening on all of the > siblings of the core in any order. > > Lastly, we also check in the schedule loop if we are about to schedule > an untrusted process while the core is in such a state. This is possible > if a trusted thread enters the scheduler by way of yielding CPU. This > would involve no transitions through the irq_exit() point to do any > waiting, so we have to explicitly do the waiting there. > > Every attempt is made to prevent a busy-wait unnecessarily, and in > testing on real-world ChromeOS usecases, it has not shown a performance > drop. In ChromeOS, with this and the rest of the core scheduling > patchset, we see around a 300% improvement in key press latencies into > Google docs when Camera streaming is running simulatenously (90th > percentile latency of ~150ms drops to ~50ms). > > This fetaure is controlled by the build time config option > CONFIG_SCHED_CORE_IRQ_PAUSE and is enabled by default. There is also a > kernel boot parameter 'sched_core_irq_pause' to enable/disable the > feature at boot time. Default is enabled at boot time.
We saw a lot of soft lockups on the screen when we tested v6.
[ 186.527883] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#86 stuck for 22s! [uperf:5551] [ 186.535884] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#87 stuck for 22s! [uperf:5444] [ 186.555883] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#89 stuck for 22s! [uperf:5547] [ 187.547884] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU [ 187.553760] rcu: 40-....: (14997 ticks this GP) idle=49a/1/0x4000000000000002 softirq=1711/1711 fqs=7279 [ 187.564685] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 14 [ 187.564723] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 38
The problem is gone when we reverted this patch. We are running multiple uperf threads(equal to cpu number) in a cgroup with coresched enabled. This is 100% reproducible on our side.
Just wonder if anything already known before we dig into it.
Thanks, -Aubrey
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