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Subject[PATCH 4.19 20/25] x86/cpu: Add table argument to cpu_matches()
Date
From: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>

commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream

To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a
pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument.

[ bp: Flip arguments order. ]

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1013,9 +1013,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
{}
};

-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
{
- const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);

return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
}
@@ -1035,29 +1035,32 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
- if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
return;

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);

if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
- if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
}

- if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);

/*
@@ -1075,7 +1078,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;

/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1084,7 +1087,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);

- if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
return;

setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);

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