Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 30 Jun 2020 10:49:56 +0200 | From | Borislav Petkov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v33 12/21] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation |
| |
On Mon, Jun 29, 2020 at 03:04:00PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > I don't see this acronym resolved anywhere in the whole patchset. > > Quoting Enclave.
Yah, pls add it somewhere.
> /dev/sgx/provision is root-only by default, the expectation is that the admin > will configure the system to grant only specific enclaves access to the > PROVISION_KEY.
Uuh, I don't like "the expectation is" - the reality happens to turn differently, more often than not.
> In this series, access is fairly binary, i.e. there's no additional kernel > infrastructure to help userspace make per-enclave decisions. There have been > more than a few proposals on how to extend the kernel to help provide better > granularity, e.g. LSM hooks, but it was generally agreed to punt that stuff > to post-upstreaming to keep things "simple" once we went far enough down > various paths to ensure we weren't painting ourselves into a corner.
So this all sounds to me like we should not upstream /dev/sgx/provision now but delay it until the infrastructure for that has been made more concrete. We can always add it then. Changing it after the fact - if we have to and for whatever reason - would be a lot harder for a user-visible interface which someone has started using already.
So I'd leave that out from the initial patchset.
> If you want super gory details, Intel's whitepaper on attestation in cloud > environments is a good starting point[*], but I don't recommended doing much > more than skimming unless you really like attestation stuff or are > masochistic, which IMO amount to the same thing :-)
No thanks. :)
-- Regards/Gruss, Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
| |