Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 3 Jun 2020 20:01:35 +0300 | From | Cyrill Gorcunov <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
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On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 06:23:26PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote: ... > > /* > - * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the > - * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the > - * path to the file in question. > + * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due > + * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on > + * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question. > */ > static const char * > proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, > struct inode *inode, > struct delayed_call *done) > { > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!(capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE))) > return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
You know, I'm still not sure if we need this capable() check at all since we have proc_fd_access_allowed() called but anyway can we please make this if() condition more explicit
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
though I won't insist. And I'll reread the series a bit later once I've some spare time to.
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