Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 29 Jun 2020 20:52:09 -0300 | From | Bruno Meneguele <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot |
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On Fri, Jun 26, 2020 at 04:23:12PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > <snip> > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > index c1583d98c5e5..a760094e8f8d 100644 > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > > @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > > switch (id) { > > case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: > > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) > > - && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { > > + && arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot()) { > > pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); > > return -EACCES; > > } > > Only IMA-appraisal enforces file integrity based on policy. >
Right, but I didn't get the relation to the code above: I basically renamed the function:
"arch_ima_get_secureboot" -> "arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot".
Which doesn't change the ima_load_data logic.
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