Messages in this thread | | | From | John Stultz <> | Date | Mon, 22 Jun 2020 12:44:44 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH bpf v2] restore behaviour of CAP_SYS_ADMIN allowing the loading of networking bpf programs |
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On Sat, Jun 20, 2020 at 2:26 PM Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@gmail.com> wrote: > > From: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> > > This is a fix for a regression introduced in 5.8-rc1 by: > commit 2c78ee898d8f10ae6fb2fa23a3fbaec96b1b7366 > 'bpf: Implement CAP_BPF' > > Before the above commit it was possible to load network bpf programs > with just the CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. > > The Android bpfloader happens to run in such a configuration (it has > SYS_ADMIN but not NET_ADMIN) and creates maps and loads bpf programs > for later use by Android's netd (which has NET_ADMIN but not SYS_ADMIN). > > Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> > Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> > Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> > Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF") > Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Thanks so much for helping narrow this regression down and submitting this fix! It's much appreciated!
Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
thanks -john
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