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    Subject[PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded
    Date
    evm_inode_init_security() requires the HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
    initial xattrs provided by LSMs. Unfortunately, with the evm_key_loaded()
    check, the function continues even if the HMAC key is not loaded
    (evm_key_loaded() returns true also if EVM has been initialized only with a
    public key). If the HMAC key is not loaded, evm_inode_init_security()
    returns an error later when it calls evm_init_hmac().

    Thus, this patch replaces the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the
    EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized, so that evm_inode_init_security()
    returns 0 instead of an error.

    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
    Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
    Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
    ---
    security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++-
    1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

    diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
    index 0d36259b690d..744c105b48d1 100644
    --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
    +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
    @@ -521,7 +521,8 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
    struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
    int rc;

    - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
    + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
    + !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
    return 0;

    xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
    --
    2.17.1
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