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SubjectRe: [PATCH] lib/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT
On Mon, Mar 2, 2020 at 11:37 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 02, 2020 at 08:53:52PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> > Document the circumstances under which refcount_t's saturation mechanism
> > works deterministically.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> With one note below...
>
> > ---
> > include/linux/refcount.h | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
> > 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h
> > index 0ac50cf62d062..cf14db393d89d 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/refcount.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h
> > @@ -38,11 +38,20 @@
> > * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it
> > * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated
> > * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the
> > - * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the
> > - * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need
> > - * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a
> > - * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with
> > - * larger increments.
> > + * underlying object.
> > + * Linux limits the maximum number of tasks to PID_MAX_LIMIT, which is currently
> > + * 0x400000 (and can't easily be raised in the future beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK).
>
> Maybe just to clarify and make readers not have to go search the source:
>
> "... beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK, which is UAPI defined as 0x3fffffff)."

The value of that thing has changed three times in git history, and
there is a comment in threads.h that refers to it as being 0x1fffffff;
so I'm a bit hesitant to copy that around further.

> and is it worth showing the math on this, just to have it clearly
> stated?

Hm, I suppose... I'll send a v2.

> -Kees
>
> > + * With the current PID limit, if no batched refcounting operations are used and
> > + * the attacker can't repeatedly trigger kernel oopses in the middle of refcount
> > + * operations, this makes it impossible for a saturated refcount to leave the
> > + * saturation range, even if it is possible for multiple uses of the same
> > + * refcount to nest in the context of a single task.
> > + * If hundreds of references are added/removed with a single refcounting
> > + * operation, it may potentially be possible to leave the saturation range; but
> > + * given the precise timing details involved with the round-robin scheduling of
> > + * each thread manipulating the refcount and the need to hit the race multiple
> > + * times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a practical avenue of attack
> > + * even if using refcount_add() operations with larger increments.

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