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SubjectRe: [PATCH] block, bfq: fix use-after-free in bfq_idle_slice_timer_body
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On 2020/3/18 1:44, Paolo Valente wrote:
>
>
>> Il giorno 17 mar 2020, alle ore 15:06, Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com> ha scritto:
>>
>> In bfq_idle_slice_timer func, bfqq = bfqd->in_service_queue is
>> not in bfqd-lock critical section. The bfqq, which is not
>> equal to NULL in bfq_idle_slice_timer, may be freed after passing
>> to bfq_idle_slice_timer_body. So we will access the freed memory.
>>
>> KASAN log is given as follows:
>> [13058.354613] ==================================================================
>> [13058.354640] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_idle_slice_timer+0xac/0x290
>> [13058.354644] Read of size 8 at addr ffffa02cf3e63f78 by task fork13/19767
>> [13058.354646]
>> [13058.354655] CPU: 96 PID: 19767 Comm: fork13
>> [13058.354661] Call trace:
>> [13058.354667] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
>> [13058.354672] show_stack+0x28/0x38
>> [13058.354681] dump_stack+0xd8/0x108
>> [13058.354687] print_address_description+0x68/0x2d0
>> [13058.354690] kasan_report+0x124/0x2e0
>> [13058.354697] __asan_load8+0x88/0xb0
>> [13058.354702] bfq_idle_slice_timer+0xac/0x290
>> [13058.354707] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x298/0x8b8
>> [13058.354710] hrtimer_interrupt+0x1b8/0x678
>> [13058.354716] arch_timer_handler_phys+0x4c/0x78
>> [13058.354722] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xf0/0x558
>> [13058.354731] generic_handle_irq+0x50/0x70
>> [13058.354735] __handle_domain_irq+0x94/0x110
>> [13058.354739] gic_handle_irq+0x8c/0x1b0
>> [13058.354742] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
>> [13058.354748] do_wp_page+0x260/0xe28
>> [13058.354752] __handle_mm_fault+0x8ec/0x9b0
>> [13058.354756] handle_mm_fault+0x280/0x460
>> [13058.354762] do_page_fault+0x3ec/0x890
>> [13058.354765] do_mem_abort+0xc0/0x1b0
>> [13058.354768] el0_da+0x24/0x28
>> [13058.354770]
>> [13058.354773] Allocated by task 19731:
>> [13058.354780] kasan_kmalloc+0xe0/0x190
>> [13058.354784] kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20
>> [13058.354788] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x130/0x440
>> [13058.354793] bfq_get_queue+0x138/0x858
>> [13058.354797] bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0xd4/0x328
>> [13058.354801] bfq_init_rq+0x1f4/0x1180
>> [13058.354806] bfq_insert_requests+0x264/0x1c98
>> [13058.354811] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x1c4/0x488
>> [13058.354818] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x2d4/0x6e0
>> [13058.354826] blk_flush_plug_list+0x230/0x548
>> [13058.354830] blk_finish_plug+0x60/0x80
>> [13058.354838] read_pages+0xec/0x2c0
>> [13058.354842] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x374/0x438
>> [13058.354846] ondemand_readahead+0x24c/0x6b0
>> [13058.354851] page_cache_sync_readahead+0x17c/0x2f8
>> [13058.354858] generic_file_buffered_read+0x588/0xc58
>> [13058.354862] generic_file_read_iter+0x1b4/0x278
>> [13058.354965] ext4_file_read_iter+0xa8/0x1d8 [ext4]
>> [13058.354972] __vfs_read+0x238/0x320
>> [13058.354976] vfs_read+0xbc/0x1c0
>> [13058.354980] ksys_read+0xdc/0x1b8
>> [13058.354984] __arm64_sys_read+0x50/0x60
>> [13058.354990] el0_svc_common+0xb4/0x1d8
>> [13058.354994] el0_svc_handler+0x50/0xa8
>> [13058.354998] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
>> [13058.354999]
>> [13058.355001] Freed by task 19731:
>> [13058.355007] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x228
>> [13058.355010] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
>> [13058.355014] kmem_cache_free+0x288/0x3f0
>> [13058.355018] bfq_put_queue+0x134/0x208
>> [13058.355022] bfq_exit_icq_bfqq+0x164/0x348
>> [13058.355026] bfq_exit_icq+0x28/0x40
>> [13058.355030] ioc_exit_icq+0xa0/0x150
>> [13058.355035] put_io_context_active+0x250/0x438
>> [13058.355038] exit_io_context+0xd0/0x138
>> [13058.355045] do_exit+0x734/0xc58
>> [13058.355050] do_group_exit+0x78/0x220
>> [13058.355054] __wake_up_parent+0x0/0x50
>> [13058.355058] el0_svc_common+0xb4/0x1d8
>> [13058.355062] el0_svc_handler+0x50/0xa8
>> [13058.355066] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
>> [13058.355067]
>> [13058.355071] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffa02cf3e63e70#012 which belongs to the cache bfq_queue of size 464
>> [13058.355075] The buggy address is located 264 bytes inside of#012 464-byte region [ffffa02cf3e63e70, ffffa02cf3e64040)
>> [13058.355077] The buggy address belongs to the page:
>> [13058.355083] page:ffff7e80b3cf9800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff802db5c90780 index:0xffffa02cf3e606f0 compound_mapcount: 0
>> [13058.366175] flags: 0x2ffffe0000008100(slab|head)
>> [13058.370781] raw: 2ffffe0000008100 ffff7e80b53b1408 ffffa02d730c1c90 ffff802db5c90780
>> [13058.370787] raw: ffffa02cf3e606f0 0000000000370023 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
>> [13058.370789] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>> [13058.370791]
>> [13058.370792] Memory state around the buggy address:
>> [13058.370797] ffffa02cf3e63e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb
>> [13058.370801] ffffa02cf3e63e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> [13058.370805] >ffffa02cf3e63f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> [13058.370808] ^
>> [13058.370811] ffffa02cf3e63f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>> [13058.370815] ffffa02cf3e64000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> [13058.370817] ==================================================================
>> [13058.370820] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
>>
>> Here, we directly pass the bfqd to bfq_idle_slice_timer_body func.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Feilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
>> ---
>> block/bfq-iosched.c | 10 +++++-----
>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c
>> index 8c436abfaf14..f470b9daa98b 100644
>> --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c
>> +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c
>> @@ -6215,20 +6215,20 @@ static struct bfq_queue *bfq_init_rq(struct request *rq)
>> return bfqq;
>> }
>>
>> -static void bfq_idle_slice_timer_body(struct bfq_queue *bfqq)
>> +static void
>> +bfq_idle_slice_timer_body(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq)
>> {
>> - struct bfq_data *bfqd = bfqq->bfqd;
>> enum bfqq_expiration reason;
>> unsigned long flags;
>>
>> spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags);
>> - bfq_clear_bfqq_wait_request(bfqq);
>> -
>> if (bfqq != bfqd->in_service_queue) {
>> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags);
>> return;
>> }
>>
>> + bfq_clear_bfqq_wait_request(bfqq);
>> +
>
> Please add a comment on why you (correctly) clear this flag only if bfqq is in service.
>
> For the rest, seems ok to me.
>
> Thank you very much for spotting and fixing this bug,
> Paolo
>
Thanks for your reply.
Considering that the bfqq may be in race, we should firstly check whether bfqq is in service before
doing something on it.

I will add a comment before 'if (bfqq != bfqd->in_service_queue) {'

In addition, the fix tag is missing. I will add it in v2 patch.

>> if (bfq_bfqq_budget_timeout(bfqq))
>> /*
>> * Also here the queue can be safely expired
>> @@ -6273,7 +6273,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bfq_idle_slice_timer(struct hrtimer *timer)
>> * early.
>> */
>> if (bfqq)
>> - bfq_idle_slice_timer_body(bfqq);
>> + bfq_idle_slice_timer_body(bfqd, bfqq);
>>
>> return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
>> }
>> --
>> 2.19.1
>>
>>
>
>
> .
>

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