Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Harden userfaultfd | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Wed, 12 Feb 2020 11:09:07 -0500 |
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On 2/11/20 6:27 PM, Daniel Colascione wrote: > On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 3:13 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: >> >> On 2/11/2020 2:55 PM, Daniel Colascione wrote: >>> Userfaultfd in unprivileged contexts could be potentially very >>> useful. We'd like to harden userfaultfd to make such unprivileged use >>> less risky. This patch series allows SELinux to manage userfaultfd >>> file descriptors and allows administrators to limit userfaultfd to >>> servicing user-mode faults, increasing the difficulty of using >>> userfaultfd in exploit chains invoking delaying kernel faults. >>> >>> A new anon_inodes interface allows callers to opt into SELinux >>> management of anonymous file objects. In this mode, anon_inodes >>> creates new ephemeral inodes for anonymous file objects instead of >>> reusing a singleton dummy inode. A new LSM hook gives security modules >>> an opportunity to configure and veto these ephemeral inodes. >>> >>> Existing anon_inodes users must opt into the new functionality. >>> >>> Daniel Colascione (6): >>> Add a new flags-accepting interface for anonymous inodes >>> Add a concept of a "secure" anonymous file >>> Teach SELinux about a new userfaultfd class >>> Wire UFFD up to SELinux >>> Let userfaultfd opt out of handling kernel-mode faults >>> Add a new sysctl for limiting userfaultfd to user mode faults >> >> This must be posted to the linux Security Module list >> <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> > > Added. I thought selinux@ was sufficient.
scripts/get_maintainer.pl can be helpful in identifying relevant lists and maintainers for each patch. I don't use its output blindly as it tends to over-approximate but since your patches span the VFS, LSM framework, and selinux, you do need to include relevant maintainers/lists for each.
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