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SubjectRe: [PATCH -tip 18/32] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode
On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 06:19:48PM -0500, Joel Fernandes (Google) wrote:
> Core-scheduling prevents hyperthreads in usermode from attacking each
> other, but it does not do anything about one of the hyperthreads
> entering the kernel for any reason. This leaves the door open for MDS
> and L1TF attacks with concurrent execution sequences between
> hyperthreads.
>
> This patch therefore adds support for protecting all syscall and IRQ
> kernel mode entries. Care is taken to track the outermost usermode exit
> and entry using per-cpu counters. In cases where one of the hyperthreads
> enter the kernel, no additional IPIs are sent. Further, IPIs are avoided
> when not needed - example: idle and non-cookie HTs do not need to be
> forced into kernel mode.
>
> More information about attacks:
> For MDS, it is possible for syscalls, IRQ and softirq handlers to leak
> data to either host or guest attackers. For L1TF, it is possible to leak
> to guest attackers. There is no possible mitigation involving flushing
> of buffers to avoid this since the execution of attacker and victims
> happen concurrently on 2 or more HTs.
>
> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
> Tested-by: Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@digitalocean.com>
> Cc: Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@digitalocean.com>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@gmail.com>
> Cc: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
> Co-developed-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +
> include/linux/entry-common.h | 12 +-
> include/linux/sched.h | 12 +
> kernel/entry/common.c | 28 +-
> kernel/sched/core.c | 241 ++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/sched/sched.h | 3 +
> 6 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index bd1a5b87a5e2..b185c6ed4aba 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -4678,6 +4678,17 @@
>
> sbni= [NET] Granch SBNI12 leased line adapter
>
> + sched_core_protect_kernel=
> + [SCHED_CORE] Pause SMT siblings of a core running in
> + user mode, if at least one of the siblings of the core
> + is running in kernel mode. This is to guarantee that
> + kernel data is not leaked to tasks which are not trusted
> + by the kernel. A value of 0 disables protection, 1
> + enables protection. The default is 1. Note that protection
> + depends on the arch defining the _TIF_UNSAFE_RET flag.
> + Further, for protecting VMEXIT, arch needs to call
> + KVM entry/exit hooks.
> +
> sched_debug [KNL] Enables verbose scheduler debug messages.
>
> schedstats= [KNL,X86] Enable or disable scheduled statistics.
> diff --git a/include/linux/entry-common.h b/include/linux/entry-common.h
> index 1a128baf3628..022e1f114157 100644
> --- a/include/linux/entry-common.h
> +++ b/include/linux/entry-common.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
> # define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (0)
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef _TIF_UNSAFE_RET
> +# define _TIF_UNSAFE_RET (0)
> +#endif
> +
> #ifndef _TIF_UPROBE
> # define _TIF_UPROBE (0)
> #endif
> @@ -74,7 +78,7 @@
> #define EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK \
> (_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
> _TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL | \
> - ARCH_EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK)
> + _TIF_UNSAFE_RET | ARCH_EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK)
>
> /**
> * arch_check_user_regs - Architecture specific sanity check for user mode regs
> @@ -444,4 +448,10 @@ irqentry_state_t noinstr irqentry_nmi_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
> */
> void noinstr irqentry_nmi_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t irq_state);
>
> +/* entry_kernel_protected - Is kernel protection on entry/exit into kernel supported? */
> +static inline bool entry_kernel_protected(void)
> +{
> + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SCHED_CORE) && sched_core_kernel_protected()
> + && _TIF_UNSAFE_RET != 0;
> +}
> #endif
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 7efce9c9d9cf..a60868165590 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -2076,4 +2076,16 @@ int sched_trace_rq_nr_running(struct rq *rq);
>
> const struct cpumask *sched_trace_rd_span(struct root_domain *rd);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
> +void sched_core_unsafe_enter(void);
> +void sched_core_unsafe_exit(void);
> +bool sched_core_wait_till_safe(unsigned long ti_check);
> +bool sched_core_kernel_protected(void);
> +#else
> +#define sched_core_unsafe_enter(ignore) do { } while (0)
> +#define sched_core_unsafe_exit(ignore) do { } while (0)
> +#define sched_core_wait_till_safe(ignore) do { } while (0)
> +#define sched_core_kernel_protected(ignore) do { } while (0)
> +#endif
> +
> #endif
> diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c
> index bc75c114c1b3..9d9d926f2a1c 100644
> --- a/kernel/entry/common.c
> +++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ static __always_inline void enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
>
> instrumentation_begin();
> trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
> +
> + if (entry_kernel_protected())
> + sched_core_unsafe_enter();
> instrumentation_end();
> }
>
> @@ -145,6 +148,26 @@ static void handle_signal_work(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ti_work)
> arch_do_signal_or_restart(regs, ti_work & _TIF_SIGPENDING);
> }
>
> +static unsigned long exit_to_user_get_work(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long ti_work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
> +
> + if (!entry_kernel_protected())
> + return ti_work;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE

This #ifdef is not necessary, entry_kernel_protected() does this check
no? The code should also compile anyway from what I can see so far.

> + ti_work &= EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK;
> + if ((ti_work & _TIF_UNSAFE_RET) == ti_work) {
> + sched_core_unsafe_exit();
> + if (sched_core_wait_till_safe(EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK)) {
> + sched_core_unsafe_enter(); /* not exiting to user yet. */
> + }
> + }
> +
> + return READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
> +#endif
> +}
> +
> static unsigned long exit_to_user_mode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs,
> unsigned long ti_work)
> {
> @@ -182,7 +205,7 @@ static unsigned long exit_to_user_mode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs,
> * enabled above.
> */
> local_irq_disable_exit_to_user();
> - ti_work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
> + ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work();
> }
>
> /* Return the latest work state for arch_exit_to_user_mode() */
> @@ -191,9 +214,10 @@ static unsigned long exit_to_user_mode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs,
>
> static void exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> - unsigned long ti_work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
> + unsigned long ti_work;
>
> lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
> + ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work();
>
> if (unlikely(ti_work & EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK))
> ti_work = exit_to_user_mode_loop(regs, ti_work);
> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
> index 20125431af87..7f807a84cc30 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
> @@ -76,6 +76,27 @@ __read_mostly int scheduler_running;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
>
> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(sched_core_protect_kernel);
> +static int __init set_sched_core_protect_kernel(char *str)
> +{
> + unsigned long val = 0;
> +
> + if (!str)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &val) && !val)
> + static_branch_disable(&sched_core_protect_kernel);
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("sched_core_protect_kernel=", set_sched_core_protect_kernel);
> +
> +/* Is the kernel protected by core scheduling? */
> +bool sched_core_kernel_protected(void)
> +{
> + return static_branch_likely(&sched_core_protect_kernel);
> +}
> +
> DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__sched_core_enabled);
>
> /* kernel prio, less is more */
> @@ -5092,6 +5113,225 @@ static inline bool cookie_match(struct task_struct *a, struct task_struct *b)
> return a->core_cookie == b->core_cookie;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Handler to attempt to enter kernel. It does nothing because the exit to
> + * usermode or guest mode will do the actual work (of waiting if needed).
> + */
> +static void sched_core_irq_work(struct irq_work *work)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline void init_sched_core_irq_work(struct rq *rq)
> +{
> + init_irq_work(&rq->core_irq_work, sched_core_irq_work);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * sched_core_wait_till_safe - Pause the caller's hyperthread until the core
> + * exits the core-wide unsafe state. Obviously the CPU calling this function
> + * should not be responsible for the core being in the core-wide unsafe state
> + * otherwise it will deadlock.
> + *
> + * @ti_check: We spin here with IRQ enabled and preempt disabled. Break out of
> + * the loop if TIF flags are set and notify caller about it.
> + *
> + * IRQs should be disabled.
> + */
> +bool sched_core_wait_till_safe(unsigned long ti_check)
> +{
> + bool restart = false;
> + struct rq *rq;
> + int cpu;
> +
> + /* We clear the thread flag only at the end, so no need to check for it. */
> + ti_check &= ~_TIF_UNSAFE_RET;
> +
> + cpu = smp_processor_id();
> + rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
> +
> + if (!sched_core_enabled(rq))
> + goto ret;

Why do we need to deal with ti_check if sched_core_enabled() is false (two statements
above)

> +
> + /* Down grade to allow interrupts to prevent stop_machine lockups.. */
> + preempt_disable();
> + local_irq_enable();
> +
> + /*
> + * Wait till the core of this HT is not in an unsafe state.
> + *
> + * Pair with raw_spin_lock/unlock() in sched_core_unsafe_enter/exit().
> + */
> + while (smp_load_acquire(&rq->core->core_unsafe_nest) > 0) {
> + cpu_relax();
> + if (READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags) & ti_check) {
> + restart = true;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* Upgrade it back to the expectations of entry code. */
> + local_irq_disable();
> + preempt_enable();
> +
> +ret:
> + if (!restart)
> + clear_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_UNSAFE_RET);
> +
> + return restart;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Enter the core-wide IRQ state. Sibling will be paused if it is running
> + * 'untrusted' code, until sched_core_unsafe_exit() is called. Every attempt to
> + * avoid sending useless IPIs is made. Must be called only from hard IRQ
> + * context.
> + */
> +void sched_core_unsafe_enter(void)
> +{
> + const struct cpumask *smt_mask;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + struct rq *rq;
> + int i, cpu;
> +
> + if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_core_protect_kernel))
> + return;
> +
> + local_irq_save(flags);
> + cpu = smp_processor_id();
> + rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
> + if (!sched_core_enabled(rq))
> + goto ret;

I am not sure about the rules of this check, do we have to do this with
irq's disabled? Given that sched_core_enabled() can only change under
stop_machine, can't we optimize this check?

> +
> + /* Ensure that on return to user/guest, we check whether to wait. */
> + if (current->core_cookie)
> + set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_UNSAFE_RET);
> +
> + /* Count unsafe_enter() calls received without unsafe_exit() on this CPU. */
> + rq->core_this_unsafe_nest++;
> +
> + /*
> + * Should not nest: enter() should only pair with exit(). Both are done
> + * during the first entry into kernel and the last exit from kernel.
> + * Nested kernel entries (such as nested interrupts) will only trigger
> + * enter() and exit() on the outer most kernel entry and exit.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->core_this_unsafe_nest != 1))
> + goto ret;
> +
> + raw_spin_lock(rq_lockp(rq));
> + smt_mask = cpu_smt_mask(cpu);
> +
> + /*
> + * Contribute this CPU's unsafe_enter() to the core-wide unsafe_enter()
> + * count. The raw_spin_unlock() release semantics pairs with the nest
> + * counter's smp_load_acquire() in sched_core_wait_till_safe().
> + */
> + WRITE_ONCE(rq->core->core_unsafe_nest, rq->core->core_unsafe_nest + 1);
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->core->core_unsafe_nest == UINT_MAX))
> + goto unlock;

I am sure this is quite unlikely unless your concerned about overflows,
will this all eventually move to under SCHED_DEBUG?

> +
> + if (irq_work_is_busy(&rq->core_irq_work)) {
> + /*
> + * Do nothing more since we are in an IPI sent from another
> + * sibling to enforce safety. That sibling would have sent IPIs
> + * to all of the HTs.
> + */
> + goto unlock;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * If we are not the first ones on the core to enter core-wide unsafe
> + * state, do nothing.
> + */
> + if (rq->core->core_unsafe_nest > 1)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + /* Do nothing more if the core is not tagged. */
> + if (!rq->core->core_cookie)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + for_each_cpu(i, smt_mask) {
> + struct rq *srq = cpu_rq(i);
> +
> + if (i == cpu || cpu_is_offline(i))
> + continue;
> +
> + if (!srq->curr->mm || is_task_rq_idle(srq->curr))
> + continue;
> +
> + /* Skip if HT is not running a tagged task. */
> + if (!srq->curr->core_cookie && !srq->core_pick)
> + continue;
> +
> + /*
> + * Force sibling into the kernel by IPI. If work was already
> + * pending, no new IPIs are sent. This is Ok since the receiver
> + * would already be in the kernel, or on its way to it.
> + */
> + irq_work_queue_on(&srq->core_irq_work, i);
> + }
> +unlock:
> + raw_spin_unlock(rq_lockp(rq));
> +ret:
> + local_irq_restore(flags);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Process any work need for either exiting the core-wide unsafe state, or for
> + * waiting on this hyperthread if the core is still in this state.
> + *
> + * @idle: Are we called from the idle loop?
> + */
> +void sched_core_unsafe_exit(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long flags;
> + unsigned int nest;
> + struct rq *rq;
> + int cpu;
> +
> + if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_core_protect_kernel))
> + return;
> +
> + local_irq_save(flags);
> + cpu = smp_processor_id();
> + rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
> +
> + /* Do nothing if core-sched disabled. */
> + if (!sched_core_enabled(rq))
> + goto ret;
> +

Same as above

> + /*
> + * Can happen when a process is forked and the first return to user
> + * mode is a syscall exit. Either way, there's nothing to do.
> + */
> + if (rq->core_this_unsafe_nest == 0)
> + goto ret;
> +
> + rq->core_this_unsafe_nest--;
> +
> + /* enter() should be paired with exit() only. */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->core_this_unsafe_nest != 0))
> + goto ret;
> +
> + raw_spin_lock(rq_lockp(rq));
> + /*
> + * Core-wide nesting counter can never be 0 because we are
> + * still in it on this CPU.
> + */
> + nest = rq->core->core_unsafe_nest;
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest);
> +
> + WRITE_ONCE(rq->core->core_unsafe_nest, nest - 1);
> + /*
> + * The raw_spin_unlock release semantics pairs with the nest counter's
> + * smp_load_acquire() in sched_core_wait_till_safe().
> + */
> + raw_spin_unlock(rq_lockp(rq));
> +ret:
> + local_irq_restore(flags);
> +}
> +
> // XXX fairness/fwd progress conditions
> /*
> * Returns
> @@ -5497,6 +5737,7 @@ static inline void sched_core_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
> rq = cpu_rq(i);
> if (rq->core && rq->core == rq)
> core_rq = rq;
> + init_sched_core_irq_work(rq);
> }
>
> if (!core_rq)
> diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
> index 615092cb693c..be6691337bbb 100644
> --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
> +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
> @@ -1074,6 +1074,8 @@ struct rq {
> unsigned int core_enabled;
> unsigned int core_sched_seq;
> struct rb_root core_tree;
> + struct irq_work core_irq_work; /* To force HT into kernel */
> + unsigned int core_this_unsafe_nest;
>
> /* shared state */
> unsigned int core_task_seq;
> @@ -1081,6 +1083,7 @@ struct rq {
> unsigned long core_cookie;
> unsigned char core_forceidle;
> unsigned int core_forceidle_seq;
> + unsigned int core_unsafe_nest;
> #endif
> };
>

Balbir Singh.

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