Messages in this thread |  | | From | Ard Biesheuvel <> | Date | Tue, 17 Nov 2020 14:33:07 +0100 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness |
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On Wed, 11 Nov 2020 at 09:19, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> wrote: > > (+ Eric) > > On Thu, 5 Nov 2020 at 16:29, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> wrote: > > > > When reseeding the CRNG periodically, arch_get_random_seed_long() is > > called to obtain entropy from an architecture specific source if one > > is implemented. In most cases, these are special instructions, but in > > some cases, such as on ARM, we may want to back this using firmware > > calls, which are considerably more expensive. > > > > Another call to arch_get_random_seed_long() exists in the CRNG driver, > > in add_interrupt_randomness(), which collects entropy by capturing > > inter-interrupt timing and relying on interrupt jitter to provide > > random bits. This is done by keeping a per-CPU state, and mixing in > > the IRQ number, the cycle counter and the return address every time an > > interrupt is taken, and mixing this per-CPU state into the entropy pool > > every 64 invocations, or at least once per second. The entropy that is > > gathered this way is credited as 1 bit of entropy. Every time this > > happens, arch_get_random_seed_long() is invoked, and the result is > > mixed in as well, and also credited with 1 bit of entropy. > > > > This means that arch_get_random_seed_long() is called at least once > > per second on every CPU, which seems excessive, and doesn't really > > scale, especially in a virtualization scenario where CPUs may be > > oversubscribed: in cases where arch_get_random_seed_long() is backed > > by an instruction that actually goes back to a shared hardware entropy > > source (such as RNDRRS on ARM), we will end up hitting it hundreds of > > times per second. > > > > So let's drop the call to arch_get_random_seed_long() from > > add_interrupt_randomness(), and instead, rely on crng_reseed() to call > > the arch hook to get random seed material from the platform. > > > > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> > > --- > > drivers/char/random.c | 15 +-------------- > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c > > index 2a41b21623ae..a9c393c1466d 100644 > > --- a/drivers/char/random.c > > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c > > @@ -1261,8 +1261,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) > > cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy(); > > __u32 c_high, j_high; > > __u64 ip; > > - unsigned long seed; > > - int credit = 0; > > > > if (cycles == 0) > > cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs); > > @@ -1298,23 +1296,12 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) > > > > fast_pool->last = now; > > __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)); > > - > > - /* > > - * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and > > - * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the > > - * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the > > - * interrupt noise. > > - */ > > - if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) { > > - __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed)); > > - credit = 1; > > - } > > spin_unlock(&r->lock); > > > > fast_pool->count = 0; > > > > /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ > > - credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1); > > + credit_entropy_bits(r, 1); > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness); > > > > -- > > 2.17.1 > >
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